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Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey
Ruling Below: Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory relief and permanent injunctions against the
enforcement of two recent amendments to Texas's laws pertaining to the performing of
abortions. On August 29, 2014, the last business day before the ambulatory surgical center
provision would go into effect, the district court delivered its opinion and issued a final judgment
enjoining the admitting privileges requirement and ambulatory surgical center provision of H.B.
2 as to all abortion facilities in Texas. The district court also enjoined other specific applications
of H.B. 2. The district court opined that together these requirements "create a brutally effective
system of abortion regulation" that is unconstitutional. Appellants (collectively "the State")
appealed to the Fifth Circuit and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's injunctions
pending the resolution of their appeal.
Question Presented: Whether Texas law places an undue burden before a woman seeking a
legal abortion.
WHOLE WOMEN’S HEALTH et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
David LAKEY, M.D., Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services, in
his Official Capacity, et al.,
Defendant – Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed on October 2, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit
Judge:
I.
On July 12, 2013, the Texas Legislature
passed H.B. 2. The proposed legislation for
what became H.B. 2 was first filed in the
Texas House of Representatives in June
2013. The House considered the bill in two
public hearings. After three readings of the
bill before the entire House, H.B. 2 passed
with a 96-49 vote. The bill was then sent to

the Texas Senate, which also held a public
hearing and read the bill three times. The
Senate engaged in a debate in which a
number of senators gave speeches for and
against the bill, and ultimately passed H.B. 2
with a final vote of 19-11.
Two of H.B. 2's provisions are at issue here.
The first requires any physician performing
an abortion to have active admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of
the location where the abortion is performed.
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The admitting privileges requirement went
into effect on October 31, 2013. The second
provision requires that all abortion clinics
existing on or after September 1, 2014,
comply with the same minimum standards
required of ambulatory surgical centers. The
regulatory standards for ambulatory surgical
centers contain two main categories: (1)
physical plant, which includes architectural,
electrical,
plumbing,
and
HVAC
requirements, and (2) operations, which
includes requirements for medical records
systems, training, staffing, and cleanliness.
We are familiar with legal challenges to H.B.
2. In 2013, the district court enjoined
enforcement of H.B. 2's admitting privileges
requirement and medication abortion
provision, and the State challenged the
injunction on appeal. In that case, we granted
in part the State's emergency motion to stay
the permanent injunction, and later upheld
both the admitting privileges requirement and
the medication abortion provision as facially
constitutional.
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiffs challenge the
admitting privileges requirement, this time
not on its face, but as applied to two specific
clinics. Whole Woman's Health and Dr.
Sherwood C. Lynn, Jr. challenge the
requirement as applied to the clinic operated
by Whole Woman's Health in McAllen. Nova
Health Systems and Dr. Pamela J. Richter
challenge the requirement as applied to the
clinic operated by Reproductive Services in
El Paso. Plaintiffs also challenge the
ambulatory surgical center provision as
unconstitutional on its face, and as applied to
the clinics in McAllen and El Paso, and as
applied to medication abortion.

The district court's judgment extended
beyond Plaintiffs' claims and the relief
requested. Not only did the district court
enjoin the admitting privileges requirement
as applied to the McAllen and El Paso clinics,
as Plaintiffs sought, the district court
determined that the admitting privileges
requirement "create[d] an impermissible
obstacle as applied to all women seeking a
previability abortion."
As to the ambulatory surgical center
provision, the district court's opinion and
final judgment are unclear. The final
judgment declares that the ambulatory
surgical center provision is unconstitutional
"as to all abortion facilities in the State" with
two exceptions: (1) facilities already licensed
and meeting the minimum standards; and (2)
all future abortion facilities commencing
operation after the effective date.
Confusingly, the judgment further declares
that the ambulatory surgical center provision
is unconstitutional and that when considered
together with the admitting privileges
requirement, "create[s] an impermissible
obstacle as applied to all women seeking a
previability abortion." In their briefs and at
oral argument, the parties expressed
uncertainty as to whether the district court
intended to invalidate this provision on its
face or, according to the earlier language, as
applied to some clinics in the state.
It is also unclear whether the district court
specifically determined that the provision is
unconstitutional as applied to the McAllen
and El Paso clinics. While Plaintiffs made
these as-applied challenges, the district court
did not directly address them in either the
declarations section of its final judgment or
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the conclusion of its opinion. However, the
district court indicated in the introductory
parts of its opinion and judgment that it
intended to do so. We note that the broad
judgment "as applied to all women" logically
would include the McAllen and El Paso
clinics, even though the district court did not
specifically address in its conclusions and
judgment Plaintiffs' as-applied claims for
these locations.
To alleviate confusion and to fairly address
the State's emergency motion and Plaintiffs'
response, we consider whether to stay
injunctions of both the admitting privileges
requirement and the ambulatory surgical
center provision on their face—or in the
district court's words, "as applied to all
women in Texas"—and as applied to the
McAllen and El Paso clinics. In addition, we
will address the injunction of the ambulatory
surgical center provision as applied to
medication abortions.
II.
"Factual findings by the district court are
typically reviewed for clear error." The
district court found, after trial with witness
credibility determinations, that Texas had
over forty abortion clinics prior to the
enactment of H.B. 2, and that after the
ambulatory surgical center provision takes
effect, only seven or eight clinics will remain,
representing more than an 80% reduction in
clinics statewide in nearly fourteen months,
with a 100% reduction in clinics west and
south of San Antonio. The district court
further found that there was no credible
evidence of medical or health benefit

associated with the ambulatory surgical
center provision in the abortion context.
The district court also found: (1) the
construction costs of bringing existing clinics
into compliance with the minimum standards
for ambulatory surgical centers "will
undisputedly approach 1 million dollars and
will most likely exceed 1.5 million dollars";
(2) "the cost of acquiring land and
constructing a new compliant clinic will
likely exceed three million dollars" for
existing clinics that cannot comply due to
physical space limitations; (3) the
enforcement of both challenged H.B. 2
provisions will increase women's travel
distances to clinics; for example, 1.3 million
women of reproductive age in Texas will live
more than 100 miles from a clinic, 900,000
women will live more than 150 miles from a
clinic, 750,000 women will live more than
200 miles from a clinic, and some women
will live as far as 500 miles from a clinic; (4)
the burdens of increased travel combine with
"practical concerns includ[ing] lack of
availability of child care, unreliability of
transportation,
unavailability
of
appointments
at
abortion
facilities,
unavailability of time off from work,
immigration status and inability to pass
border checkpoints, poverty level, [and] the
time and expense involved in traveling long
distances"; and (5) the remaining seven or
eight clinics likely will not have the capacity
to perform 60,000-72,000 abortions per year
in Texas.
III.
We consider four factors in deciding whether
to grant a stay pending appeal:
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(1) whether the stay applicant has
made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4)
where the public interest lies.
A stay "is not a matter of right, even if
irreparable injury might otherwise result to
the appellant."
The State initially filed a motion to stay in
this court and, shortly thereafter, filed the
same motion with the district court. The
district court denied the motion "for
substantially the reasons stated in its
memorandum opinion." Plaintiffs do not
object to the order in which the State filed its
motions and agree that the present motion is
properly before us.
IV.
"Before viability, a State may not prohibit
any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy." Nor
may a State "impose upon this right an undue
burden, which exists if a regulation's purpose
or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability." To
determine the constitutionality of a state law,
we ask "whether the Act, measured by its text
in this facial attack, imposes a substantial
obstacle to . . . previability[] abortions."
Following Carhart and Casey, our circuit
conducts a two-step approach, first applying
a rational basis test, then independently

determining if the burden on a woman's
choice is undue.
A.
Though Plaintiffs sought only as-applied
relief from the admitting privileges
requirement, limited to two abortion
clinics—one in El Paso and one in
McAllen—the district court, in its final
judgment, appears to have facially
invalidated
the
admitting
privileges
requirement throughout Texas. This was
inappropriate because Plaintiffs did not
request that relief. Furthermore, the district
court's facial invalidation of the admitting
privileges requirement is directly contrary to
this circuit's precedent. Abbott II specifically
upheld the facial constitutionality of the
admitting privileges requirement.
B.
We now turn to the central question presented
by this emergency motion: whether the State
has shown a likelihood of success regarding
whether the ambulatory surgical center
provision is unconstitutional on its face. We
conclude that it has.
As explained in Abbott II, if the State
establishes that a law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, we do not second
guess the legislature regarding the law's
wisdom or effectiveness. Nor is the State
"required to prove that the objective of the
law would be fulfilled."
The district court concluded that H.B. 2,
including both provisions at issue here,
"surmount[ed] the low bar of rational-basis
review." We agree with the district court's
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conclusion that the ambulatory surgical
center provision satisfies rational basis
review. In addition, no party challenges the
district court's conclusion.
Thus, our review will focus on the second
step of this circuit's approach; namely,
whether this provision imposes an undue
burden. The undue burden inquiry looks to
whether the challenged provision has either
"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."
1.
We begin with the purpose inquiry.
"[P]laintiffs bore the burden of attacking the
State's purpose here," and the State has
shown a strong likelihood that Plaintiffs
failed to meet that burden.

abortion facilities disparately from other
ambulatory surgical centers in this respect.
According to the State, there is no
ambulatory surgical center exemption for any
facility within the statutorily-defined subset
requiring licensure, regardless of whether it
provides abortions. The provision cited by
the district court provides an exemption to
any facility previously licensed as an
ambulatory surgical center that failed to
comply with new building code requirements
amended in June 2009. Any such facility,
regardless of whether it provides abortions,
qualifies for the exemption. Based on our
review of the relevant provision, we agree
with the State that ambulatory surgical
centers providing abortions are not treated
differently from other ambulatory surgical
centers.

The district court determined that "the
ambulatory-surgical-center requirement was
intended to close existing licensed abortion
clinics." To support its conclusion, the
district court determined that H.B. 2 treats
abortion facilities in a "disparate and
arbitrary" manner by not including an
exception to the ambulatory surgical center
provision for previously licensed abortion
providers. According to the district court,
"other types of ambulatory-surgical facilities
are frequently granted waivers or are
grandfathered due to construction dates that
predate
the
newer
construction
requirements."

Besides its view of the above regulation, the
district court cited no record evidence to
support its determination that the ambulatory
surgical center provision was enacted for the
purpose of imposing an undue burden on
women seeking abortions, nor did it make
any factual finding regarding an improper
purpose. The Texas Legislature's stated
purpose was to improve patient safety. As we
observed in Abbott I, the State of Texas has
an "interest in protecting the health of women
who undergo abortion procedures." Courts
are not permitted to second guess a
legislature's stated purposes absent clear and
compelling evidence to the contrary. Such
evidence simply does not appear in the record
here.

The State argues that the district court
misunderstood the relevant provision in the
governing Texas regulation. As the State
reads the provision, H.B. 2 does not treat

Alternatively, the district court opined that it
was "not required" to find actual evidence of
improper purpose because H.B. 2's
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ambulatory surgical center provision has the
effect of creating an undue burden. To the
extent the district court found an improper
purpose based on the law's effect, the State is
likely to succeed on the merits.
2.
We now evaluate whether the State has
shown a likelihood of success on the merits
of whether the ambulatory surgical center
provision "has the effect of imposing an
unconstitutional burden" sufficient to justify
a facial invalidation. The State has made such
a showing.
Facial challenges relying on the effects of a
law "impose[] a heavy burden upon the
part[y] maintaining the suit." In Carhart, the
Supreme Court recognized the existence of
divergent views as to "[w]hat that burden
consists of in the specific context of abortion
statutes . . . ." It is well-settled in this circuit
that "[a] facial challenge will succeed only
where the plaintiff shows that there is no set
of circumstances under which the statute
would be constitutional." The Supreme Court
uses the same "no set of circumstances" rule
in general for facial challenges. However, as
we noted in Abbott II, it is not clear whether
the Supreme Court applies this general rule in
abortion cases.
In Casey, the controlling plurality held that
an abortion-regulating statute would fail
constitutional muster if, "in a large fraction of
the cases in which it is relevant, it will operate
as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an abortion." In earlier abortion
cases, the Court used the "no set of
circumstances" approach. The more recent

Carhart majority did not choose between "no
set of circumstances" and "large fraction,"
but instead upheld the statute in question on
the basis that the facial challenge could not
satisfy either standard. We will do the same
here, as we did in Abbott I and Abbott II, and
"apply the 'large fraction' nomenclature for
the sake of argument only, without casting
doubt on the general rule."
The ambulatory surgical center provision
applies to all clinics performing abortions.
Every woman in Texas who seeks an abortion
will be affected to some degree by this
requirement because it effectively narrows
her options for where to obtain an abortion.
As the parties stipulated at trial, six licensed
ambulatory surgical centers "will not be
prevented by the ambulatory surgical center
[provision] of HB 2 from performing
abortions." These are located in Austin,
Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San
Antonio. The parties also stipulated that
Planned Parenthood has obtained a license to
open a new ambulatory surgical center in
Dallas, and announced its intention to open
another one in San Antonio. However, the
parties further stipulated that all other
abortion facilities now licensed by the State
of Texas cannot currently comply with the
provision. The district court concluded that
this reduction in supply of clinics was an
undue burden and facially invalidated the
ambulatory surgical center provision. In
doing so, the district court applied neither the
Fifth Circuit's "no set of circumstances" test
nor Casey's "large fraction" test. Instead, the
district court found that "a significant number
of the reproductive-age female population of
Texas will need to travel considerably further
in order to exercise its right to a legal
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previability abortion." The district court
"conclude[d] that the practical impact on
Texas women due to the clinics' closure
statewide would operate for a significant
number of women in Texas just as drastically
as a complete ban on abortion." However,
under this circuit's precedent, and Carhart, a
"significant number" is insufficient unless it
amounts to a "large fraction."
The district court also erred when it balanced
the efficacy of the ambulatory surgical center
provision against the burdens the provision
imposed. In the district court's view, "the
severity of the burden imposed by both
requirements is not balanced by the weight of
the interests underlying them." As support for
this proposition, the court evaluated whether
the ambulatory surgical center provision
would actually improve women's health and
safety. This approach contravenes our
precedent. In our circuit, we do not balance
the wisdom or effectiveness of a law against
the burdens the law imposes.
The district court's weighing of the interests
basically boils down to the district court's
own view that the facilities are already safe
for women and that the ambulatory surgical
center provision, when implemented, will not
serve to promote women's health. However,
Abbott II discusses in detail the perils of
second-guessing the wisdom of the
legislature in a constitutional challenge:
If legislators' predictions about a law
fail to serve their purpose, the law can
be changed. Once the courts have
held a law unconstitutional, however,
only a constitutional amendment, or
the wisdom of a majority of justices
overcoming the strong pull of stare

decisis, will permit that or similar
laws to again take effect.
Moreover, the district court's approach
ratchets up rational basis review into a
pseudo-strict-scrutiny
approach
by
examining whether the law advances the
State's asserted purpose. Under our
precedent, we have no authority by which to
turn rational basis into strict scrutiny under
the guise of the undue burden inquiry.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court's
balancing approach is used by other circuits.
We agree with Plaintiffs that some circuits
have used the balancing test to enjoin
abortion regulations; other circuits—
including ours—have not. We are bound to
follow our circuit's approach.
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Barnes v.
Mississippi, supports a balancing approach.
However, a careful reading of Barnes
establishes that it does not support Plaintiffs'
argument. In Barnes, we cited Casey for the
proposition that "the constitutionality of an
abortion regulation . . . turns on an
examination of the importance of the state's
interests in the regulation and the severity of
the burden that regulation imposes on a
woman's right to seek an abortion." We then
analyzed the importance of the State's interest
in parental involvement statutes, without
considering the extent to which the
challenged law actually advanced that
interest. Likewise here, the health of women
seeking abortions is an important purpose.
Our only remaining task is to analyze the
severity of the burden the regulation imposes
on women's right to seek abortions.
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The district court's failure to apply the "large
fraction" test, and its reliance on its own
balancing of the State's justifications against
the burdens imposed by the law, weigh in
favor of the State's strong likelihood of
success on the merits. Moreover, application
of the "large fraction" test to the evidence
before us further supports the State's position
that the evidence at the four-day trial is
insufficient to show that a "large fraction" of
women seeking abortions would face an
undue burden on account of the ambulatory
surgical center provision.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Daniel Grossman,
opined that the ambulatory surgical center
provision would increase driving distances
for women generally, noting that after the
provision becomes effective, 900,000 out of
approximately 5.4 million women of
reproductive age in Texas would live at least
150 miles from the nearest clinic. He did not
testify specifically about how many women
seeking abortions would have to drive more
than 150 miles or whether that number would
amount to a large fraction. Assuming that
women seeking abortions are proportionally
distributed across the state, Dr. Grossman's
evidence suggests that approximately one out
of six (16.7%) women seeking an abortion
will live more than 150 miles from the nearest
clinic.
Even assuming, arguendo, that 150 miles is
the relevant cut-off, this is nowhere near a
"large fraction." As discussed above, the
Casey plurality, in using the "large fraction"
nomenclature, departed from the general
standard for facial challenges. The general
standard for facial challenges allows courts to
facially invalidate a statute only if "no

possible application of the challenged law
would be constitutional." In other words, the
law must be unconstitutional in 100% of its
applications. We decline to interpret Casey as
changing the threshold for facial challenges
from 100% to 17%.
Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate
denominator in the large fraction analysis
consists only of women "who could have
accessed abortion services in Texas prior to
implementation
of
the
challenged
requirements, but who will face increased
obstacles as a result of the law." To narrow
the denominator in this way—to essentially
only those women who Plaintiffs argue will
face an undue burden—ignores precedent.
Casey itself counsels that the denominator
should encompass all women "for whom the
law is a restriction." This is also the approach
that our circuit used in Abbott II. Here, the
ambulatory surgical center requirement
applies to every abortion clinic in the State,
limiting the options for all women in Texas
who seek an abortion. The appropriate
denominator thus includes all women
affected by these limited options. Moreover,
Plaintiffs' suggested approach would make
the large fraction test merely a tautology,
always resulting in a large fraction. The
denominator would be women that Plaintiffs
claim are unduly burdened by the statute, and
the numerator would be the same.
Based on unspecific testimony at trial, the
district court also noted "practical concerns"
that combine with increased travel distances,
particularly for disadvantaged, minority, and
immigrant populations. We do not doubt that
women in poverty face greater difficulties.
However, to sustain a facial challenge, the
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Supreme Court and this circuit require
Plaintiffs to establish that the law itself
imposes an undue burden on at least a large
fraction of women. Plaintiffs have not done
so here.
The district court also relied on its own
determination that the ambulatory surgical
center provision would cause a shortage in
capacity for the remaining licensed clinics.
The district court found that 60,000-72,000
abortions were performed annually in
previous years. After the ambulatory surgical
center provision goes into effect, it is
undisputed that seven or eight clinics will
remain. Based on Dr. Grossman's testimony,
the district court then determined that each
remaining clinic would have to manage, on
average, 7,500-10,000 patients a year, over
1,200 patients per month in some cases. Id.
The district court found that handling this
high a caseload "stretches credulity."
However, the district court did not make any
findings of fact to support its conclusion. Nor
could it, given that Dr. Grossman's testimony
is ipse dixit and the record lacks any actual
evidence regarding the current or future
capacity of the eight clinics. Dr. Grossman
simply assumes, without evidence, that these
centers are currently operating at full
capacity and will be unable to accommodate
any increased demand. Likewise, Dr.
Grossman did not consider how many
physicians with admitting privileges from
non-ambulatory surgical centers will begin
providing abortions at the ambulatory
surgical center clinics, thereby increasing
those clinics' capacities. It also does not
appear from the record that Dr. Grossman
considered the possibility of additional

capacity resulting from new clinics' being
built, nor did he consider that the demand for
abortion services in Texas may decrease in
the future, as it has done nationally over the
past several years. Furthermore, the record
lacks evidence that the previous closures
resulting from the admitting privileges
requirement have caused women to be turned
away from clinics. Without any evidence on
these points, Plaintiffs do not appear to have
met their burden to show that the ambulatory
surgical center provision will result in
insufficient clinic capacity that will impose
an undue burden on a large fraction of
women.
The evidence does indicate, without
specificity, that by requiring all abortion
clinics to meet the minimum standards of
ambulatory surgical centers, the overall cost
of accessing an abortion provider will likely
increase. However, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Carhart, and we observed in
Abbott I, "'[t]he fact that a law which serves a
valid purpose, one not designed to strike at
the right itself, has the incidental effect of
making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.'"
In sum, the State has met its burden as to the
district court's facial invalidation of the
admitting privileges requirement and the
ambulatory surgical center provision.
V.
Finally, we address the district court's
injunctions of both requirements as applied to
clinics in McAllen and El Paso, as well as the
ambulatory surgical center provision as
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applied to medication abortion, and the
State's likelihood of success on the merits of
each. We conclude that the State has met its
burden as to each, with the exception of the
ambulatory surgical center provision as
applied to El Paso.
A.
The State has shown a strong likelihood of
success on the merits of its argument that
Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to the
admitting privileges requirement are barred
by res judicata. In the interests of efficiency
and finality, the doctrine of res judicata bars
litigation of claims that have been litigated or
could have been raised in a prior lawsuit. In
the lawsuit giving rise to Abbott I and Abbott
II, Plaintiffs facially challenged the admitting
privileges requirement. They also could have
brought, but chose not to bring, as-applied
challenges with regard to clinics in El Paso
and McAllen. Their choice not to include the
as-applied challenges in their previous
lawsuit likely precludes them from pursuing
that challenge now.
To be sure, res judicata bars a subsequent
lawsuit only if, inter alia, the same "claim or
cause of action" is involved in both lawsuits.
To determine whether two lawsuits involve
the same "claim or cause of action" for
purposes of res judicata, the Fifth Circuit
applies the transactional test of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 24.
Under that test, the "critical issue is whether
the two actions under consideration are based
on 'the same nucleus of operative facts.'" If
the facts on which the second lawsuit is based
are the same as those prevailing at the time of
the first lawsuit, the two lawsuits involve the

same "claim or cause of action" for purposes
of res judicata.
Plaintiffs contended, and the district court
agreed, that the present lawsuit relies on a
different set of operative facts than did the
pre-enforcement challenge because the
abortion clinics in McAllen and El Paso have
now ceased providing abortion services.
However, our precedent dictates that changed
circumstances prevent the application of res
judicata only if the change is "significant"
and creates "new legal conditions." The
closure of the clinics in McAllen and El Paso
does not create "new legal conditions"
because, in the pre-enforcement challenge,
Plaintiffs alleged that the McAllen and El
Paso clinics would shut down upon
implementation of H.B. 2. Plaintiffs could
have relied on these allegations to bring the
very same as-applied challenge they now
pursue; they simply chose not to do so.
The district court stated that "it was not
known in late October 2013 [i.e., when the
district court entered its judgment in Abbott]
that the McAllen and El Paso clinics'
physicians would ultimately be unable to
obtain admitting privileges despite efforts to
secure them." However, the Complaint in
Abbott, which was filed in September 2013,
expressly alleged that those clinics would
close if the admitting privileges requirement
took effect. Indeed, the physicians who
performed abortions at those two facilities
were named plaintiffs in Abbott, further
undermining any suggestion that the closure
of the clinics was a significant or unexpected
change of facts. Thus, Plaintiffs' as-applied
challenges to the admitting privileges
requirement are likely barred by res judicata.
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B.
Even if Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by res
judicata, the State is still likely to succeed on
the merits of whether the admitting privileges
requirement and the ambulatory surgical
center provision, as applied to the McAllen
clinic, have the effect of imposing an undue
burden on women in the Rio Grande Valley.
The admitting privileges requirement went
into effect in October 2013. Since that time,
abortion clinics have remained open in all of
the major metropolitan areas across the state.
The district court found that the number of
total clinics in Texas decreased from more
than forty clinics to fewer than thirty clinics
"leading up to and in the wake of
enforcement of the admitting-privileges
requirement." Importantly, Dr. Grossman
stated in his declaration that he was not
"offering any opinion on the cause of the
decline in the number of abortion facilities
from November 2012 to April 2014." The
district court further found that no abortion
providers are in operation in a number of
cities, including, for example, McAllen,
Lubbock, Midland, and Waco. The
ambulatory surgical center provision was set
to go into effect on September 1, 2014, which
the district court found would cause even
more closures, leaving only seven or eight
licensed providers.
The district court found that the McAllen
clinic closed as a result of the admitting
privileges requirement.. Since that time, the
women who would have otherwise been
served by the McAllen clinic had to look
elsewhere for the procedure. As stated in his
trial declaration, Dr. Grossman identified

more than 1,000 women from the Valley who
sought abortions between November 2013
and April 2014, and traveled to nearby cities
where clinics remained open. During that
period, approximately 50% of those women
traveled to Corpus Christi, 25% traveled to
Houston, 15% percent to San Antonio, and
10% to a location even farther from the
Valley.
In Abbott II, relying on Casey, we held that
having to travel 150 miles from the Rio
Grande Valley to Corpus Christi is not an
undue burden. Indeed, Casey permitted even
greater travel distances, as it upheld a 24-hour
waiting period that doubled driving times,
increasing the drive for some women from
three hours to six hours.
While the clinic in Corpus Christi remained
open after the admitting privileges
requirement went into effect, it currently does
not comply with the ambulatory surgical
center provision. The district court found that
once the provision takes effect, the clinic
nearest to the Rio Grande Valley will be in
San Antonio, between 230 and 250 miles
away. Therefore, we must determine whether
the State is likely to prevail on its argument
that this incremental increase of 100 miles in
distance does not constitute an undue burden.
At trial, Plaintiffs had the burden of showing
that the additional travel distance to San
Antonio constituted an undue burden. As
noted above, the record indicates that 50% of
the more than 1,000 women in Dr.
Grossman's study who resided in the Rio
Grande Valley and were seeking abortions
traveled to San Antonio and Houston (which
is even farther than San Antonio) even when
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the Corpus Christi clinic was still in
operation. Plaintiffs also had the burden,
which they failed to meet, of showing that
clinics in San Antonio and other nearby cities
would be unable to manage the additional
demand for abortions caused by closures.
Indeed, women from McAllen have been
traveling outside their city for nearly a year
and Plaintiffs made no showing that clinics in
San Antonio (or any other city) have been
deluged. Considering that Casey upheld
travel times of six hours (increases of three
hours) and that women in the Rio Grande
Valley traveling to San Antonio have less
total travel time than women affected by the
Pennsylvania law in Casey, the State has a
strong likelihood of success on its appeal of
the injunctions of both requirements as
applied to the McAllen clinic.
C.
As to the El Paso clinic, we grant, in part, and
deny, in part, the State's motion to stay the
district court's injunction of the ambulatory
surgical center provision. The district court
found that the physical plant requirements of
the ambulatory surgical center provision
would force the El Paso clinic to close. As a
result, women in El Paso will be significantly
farther from the nearest in-state ambulatory
surgical center than women in the Rio Grande
Valley. The distance from El Paso to San
Antonio, for example, is greater than 500
miles. The Eighth Circuit has held that no
travel distance within the state is too far. We
have not so held. Our circuit has not
identified whether there is a tipping point
within the vast State of Texas, but at this early
stage, we are hesitant to extend Casey to such
a large distance.

It is true that approximately half of the
women from El Paso seeking abortions travel
to Santa Teresa, New Mexico, which is in the
same metropolitan area as El Paso and just
across the state line. Despite the obvious
practical implications of the New Mexico
clinic's proximity to El Paso, our circuit's
precedent suggests that our focus must
remain on clinics within Texas when
determining whether travel times create an
undue burden. Although the situation in
Texas is markedly different from that in
Mississippi, the opinion in Jackson contains
broad language that appears to go beyond the
facts presented in that case. The panel
majority saw itself as "require[d] . . . to
conduct the undue burden inquiry by looking
only at the ability of Mississippi women to
exercise their right within Mississippi's
borders." Given the panel's reliance on
Gaines, the panel may have meant to apply
its limitation only to states where all the
abortion clinics would close. However, we
are reluctant to construe the panel's broad
language so narrowly in this emergency stay
proceeding. Because of the long distance
between El Paso and the nearest in-state
abortion clinic, as well as the doubt that
Jackson casts on whether we may look to outof-state clinics, the State has not shown a
strong likelihood of success on the merits of
the challenge to the physical plant
requirements of the ambulatory surgical
center provision as applied to El Paso. Thus,
the district court's injunction of the physical
plant requirements of the ambulatory surgical
provision will remain in force for El Paso.
We do, however, stay the injunction as to the
operational requirements of the ambulatory
surgical center provision because the district
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court made no findings about whether the El
Paso clinic would be able to comply with
those requirements. The district court's
conclusion that the ambulatory surgical
center provision imposed an undue burden
rested solely on the district court's findings
regarding the physical plant requirements. In
view of H.B. 2's severability provision, as
well as the similar provision in the
regulations, the district court erred by failing
to consider whether the physical plant
requirements could be severed from the
operational requirements, allowing the
operational requirements to take effect. As a
result, it does not appear that the district
court's injunction of the operational
requirements was supported by any evidence.
We therefore stay the district court's
injunction of the operational requirements.

inquiry. The district court provided no
support for its conclusion other than its
improper balancing. The district court did not
cite to record evidence or make any findings
to support its conclusion that the ambulatory
surgical center provision imposes an undue
burden as applied to medication abortions.
Indeed, at oral argument, Plaintiffs could not
identify any findings in the district court's
opinion supporting the conclusion that the
ambulatory surgical center provision
imposed an undue burden as applied to
medication abortion. Thus, the State has
shown a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of the district court's injunction of
the ambulatory surgical center provision as
applied to medication abortions.

D.

As in Abbott I, the State has made a strong
showing of likelihood of success on the
merits of its appeal as to all of the district
court's injunctions except for the injunction
of the physical plant requirements of the
ambulatory surgical center provision as
applied to the clinic in El Paso. Regarding the
other three factors we must weigh in
determining whether to grant a motion to stay
pending appeal, the State has also met its
burden. "When a statute is enjoined, the State
necessarily suffers the irreparable harm of
denying the public interest in the
enforcement of its laws. The public interest is
directly aligned with the State's interest. To
the extent the State's interest is at stake, so is
the public's. We recognize that Plaintiffs have
also made a strong showing that their
interests will be injured by a grant of the stay.
However, given that the first two factors are
the most critical, and the State has made a

The district court also enjoined the
ambulatory surgical center provision as
applied to medication abortions. To the
extent the district court concluded that the
ambulatory surgical center provision had an
improper purpose as applied to medication
abortion, we have already rejected that
argument for the reasons stated above. To
the extent that the district court determined
that the provision's effect as applied to
medication abortion was unconstitutional, the
record evidence does not support that
conclusion. In conducting its own balancing
analysis, the district court stated that "any
medical justification for the requirement is at
its absolute weakest in comparison with the
heavy burden it imposes." However, as
discussed, our circuit does not incorporate a
balancing analysis into the undue burden
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strong showing regarding each, a stay is
appropriate. We have addressed only the
issues necessary to rule on the motion for a
stay pending appeal, and our determinations
are for that purpose and do not bind the merits
panel.
IT IS ORDERED that Appellants' opposed
motion for stay pending appeal is
GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part,
and that the district court's injunction orders
are STAYED until the final disposition of
this appeal, in accordance with this opinion.
STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit
Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I too would deny the State's motion for a
blanket stay of the district court judgment
entered on August 29, 2014, pending appeal.
I agree with a stay of the district court's facial
invalidation of the admitting-privileges
requirement because the plaintiffs did not
request that relief. Second, I agree with a stay
to allow enforcement of the operational
requirements of the ambulatory surgical
center ("ASC") provision because the district
court only evaluated the burdens imposed by
the provision's physical plant requirements.
Applying H.B. 2's severability provision,
however, I would not stay the district court's
facial invalidation of the physical plant
requirements. Finally, I would narrow the
stay so that it does not reach the admissionprivileges requirement as applied to the
McAllen and El Paso clinics, which the
district court found would result in closure of
all clinics west and south of San Antonio.

As to the first stay factor, the district court
found, after trial with witness credibility
determinations, that an undue burden existed
because Texas had over forty abortion clinics
prior to the enactment of H.B. 2, and that after
the ASC provision takes effect, only seven or
eight clinics will remain, representing more
than an 80% reduction in clinics statewide in
nearly fourteen months, with a 100%
reduction in clinics west and south of San
Antonio. The district court further found that
there was no credible evidence of medical or
health benefit associated with the ASC
requirement in the abortion context. At this
emergency stay point, the State does not
challenge as clear error either set of factual
findings. Weighing lack of medical benefit
against the significant reduction in clinic
access, the district court found the burden to
be "undue."
The majority opinion disagrees, concluding
especially that the district court "erred when
it balanced the efficacy of the ambulatory
surgical center provision against the burdens
the provision imposed." For my part, I do not
read Abbott II to preclude consideration of
the relationship between the severity of the
obstacle imposed and the weight of the State's
interest in determining if the burden is
"undue." Although I agree with the majority
opinion that Abbott II rejected the district
court's assessment of empirical data as part of
its rational-basis analysis, Abbott II did not
expressly disclaim such an inquiry for
purposes of the undue-burden prong. In
Abbott II—in contrast to the district court's
factual findings in this case—our court
concluded that there had been "no showing
whatsoever that any woman [would] lack
reasonable access to a clinic within Texas."
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In light of the minimal or non-existent burden
found on that record, the court in Abbott II
did not need to conduct an in-depth analysis
of the State's interest as part of its undueburden review. Other courts' criticism of
Abbott II on this ground is therefore inexact.
Consistent with this analysis, the district
court considered the weight of the State's
interest in its undue-burden review. In doing
so, the district court adhered to reasoning that
reconciles, rather than divides, circuit
authority applying Casey's undue-burden
test.
I also do not see a strong likelihood of legal
error related to the district court's
demographic calculations pertaining to
impact on women, relevant both to its facial
invalidation of the ASC provision, as well as
to our stay factors. First, the district court
recognized that there are 5.4 million women
of reproductive age in Texas. Next, the
district court found that if the ASC provision
goes into effect, 900,000 women will live
more than 150 miles from an abortion clinic;
750,000 women will live more than 200
miles from a clinic; and some women will
live as far as 500 miles or more from a clinic.
Furthermore, the district court explicitly
considered the financial and other practical
obstacles that interact with and compound the
burdens imposed by the law, both in it its
discernment of a substantial obstacle and also
in its assessment of impact on women.
Finally, the district court also found that the
remaining seven or eight abortion ASCs lack
sufficient capacity to accommodate all
women seeking abortions in the state. Indeed,
these remaining clinics would have to
increase by at least fourfold the number of

abortions they perform annually. Altogether,
although the district court did not use the
phrase "large fraction," its findings—which
related not only to travel distances but also to
other practical obstacles—demonstrate that
enforcement of the ASC provision will likely
affect a significant number and a large
fraction of women across the state of Texas.
As to the remaining stay factors, which
reasonable minds may balance differently,
and in this case do, it is nonetheless
undisputed that the State for decades has not
held plaintiffs' clinics to ASC standards—
indeed, never until now. Based on the record
established at trial, assessed firsthand by the
district court, I do not perceive that Texas has
demonstrated urgency, medical or otherwise,
to immediate enforcement. After hearing
conflicting expert testimony, the district
court found that "abortion in Texas [is]
extremely safe with particularly low rates of
serious complications," and further found
that "risks are not appreciably lowered for
patients who undergo abortion at ambulatory
surgical centers." The denial of a stay would
preserve this status quo pending our court's
ultimate decision on the correctness of the
district court's ruling.
On the other hand, the district court found
that if the ASC requirement goes into effect
plaintiffs likely will suffer substantial injury,
notably that enforcement would cause clinics
to close in Corpus Christi, San Antonio,
Austin, McAllen, El Paso, Houston, and
Dallas. The longer these clinics remain
closed, the less likely they are to reopen if this
court affirms that the law is unconstitutional.
The district court further found that only
seven or eight clinics will remain open, and
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that these clinics alone lack sufficient
capacity. Unless shown to be clear error, this
circumstance is comparable to the one the
Seventh Circuit observed would subject
patients "to weeks of delay because of the
sudden shortage of eligible [clinics]—and
delay in obtaining an abortion can result in
the progression of a pregnancy to a stage at
which an abortion would be less safe, and
eventually illegal."

Agreeing not to impose a blanket stay on
direct appeal, but not having convinced
colleagues whom I respect as to the scope of
the stay that is appropriate, I would grant the
State's independent request to expedite its
appeal of an underlying issue that has
complexity which divides courts, as well as
profundity which divides convictions deeper
than the rules of law courts must apply.
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“Supreme Court Allows Texas Abortion Clinics to Stay Open”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
October 14, 2014
The Supreme Court on Tuesday allowed
more than a dozen Texas abortion clinics to
reopen, blocking a state law that had imposed
strict requirements on abortion providers.
Had the law been allowed to stand, it would
have caused all but eight of the state’s
abortion clinics to close and would have
required many women to travel more than
150 miles to the nearest abortion provider.

performing abortions to have admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital.

The Supreme Court’s order — five sentences
long and with no explanation of the justices’
reasoning — represents an interim step in a
legal fight that is far from over. But abortion
rights advocates welcomed what they said
was the enormous practical impact of the
move. Had the clinics been forced to remain
closed while appeals went forward, they said,
they might never have reopened.

Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. said they would have
allowed the law to be enforced.

State officials said the law’s requirements
were needed to protect women’s health.
Abortion providers said the regulations were
expensive, unnecessary and a ruse meant to
put many of them out of business.

The Supreme Court, in an unsigned order
apparently reflecting the views of six justices,
blocked the surgical-center requirement
entirely and the admitting-privileges
requirement as it applied to clinics in
McAllen, Tex., and El Paso.

Abortion rights advocates praised the order.
“Tomorrow, 13 clinics across the state will be
allowed to reopen and provide women with
safe and legal abortion care in their own
communities,” said Nancy Northup,
president of the Center for Reproductive
Rights, adding that advocates were still
pursuing appeals. “This fight against Texas’
sham abortion law is not over.”

The justices addressed two parts of the Texas
law that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit had provisionally let
stand while it considered an appeal.

The appeals court’s decision had left only
eight clinics open in Texas, all clustered in
metropolitan regions in the eastern part of the
state. No abortion facilities were operating
west or south of San Antonio.

One of them required all abortion clinics in
the state to meet the standards for
“ambulatory surgical centers,” including
regulations concerning buildings, equipment
and staffing. The other required doctors

“If the stay entered by the Fifth Circuit is not
vacated,” lawyers with the Center for
Reproductive Rights told the Supreme Court,
“the clinics forced to remain closed during
the appeals process will likely never reopen.”
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The appeals court’s ruling, the center’s brief
said, meant that “over 900,000 Texas women
of reproductive age, more than a sixth of all
such women in Texas, now reside more than
150 miles from the nearest Texas abortion
provider, up from 86,000 prior to the
enactment of the challenged act.”
In response, Greg Abbott, Texas’ attorney
general and the Republican candidate for
governor, told the justices that “it is
undisputed that the vast majority of Texas
residents (more than 83 percent) still live
within a comfortable driving distance (150
miles)” of an abortion clinic in compliance
with the law. Others live in parts of the state,
he said, that did not have nearby clinics in the
first place.
Those in the El Paso area, Mr. Abbott
continued, could obtain abortions across the
state line in New Mexico.
The appeals court, drawing on the Supreme
Court’s last major abortion decision, said the
law’s challengers had not shown that a “large
fraction” of women seeking abortions would
face an unconstitutional burden thanks to the
law.
The law in question, which includes some of
the nation’s toughest abortion restrictions,
was enacted last year by the Republican-led
Legislature. Before it came into force, 41
medical practices were licensed to provide
abortions in Texas.
The law was passed after a marathon
filibuster that turned a Democratic state
senator, Wendy Davis, into a national

political star and set the stage for her
campaign for governor against Mr. Abbott.
“The court recognized that these deeply
personal decisions should be made by a
woman with the guidance of her family and
her doctor,” Ms. Davis said Tuesday night in
a statement. “The actions by Austin
politicians like Greg Abbott had closed all
but eight Texas reproductive health centers
and harmed the health and safety of hundreds
of thousands of women throughout the state.”
In August, Judge Lee Yeakel of the Federal
District Court in Austin ruled that the
surgical-center
rule
imposed
an
unconstitutional burden on women seeking
abortions. The number and location of the
clinics it would effectively close, the judge
wrote, burdened the exercise of a
constitutional right for many women “just as
drastically as a complete ban on abortion.”
On Tuesday, Yvonne Gutierrez, the
executive director of Planned Parenthood’s
Texas political action committee, said the
Supreme Court’s action was a rebuke to Mr.
Abbott.
“Today the Supreme Court ruled that Greg
Abbott cannot force nearly a million Texas
women to drive over 300 miles to access their
constitutionally protected right to safe and
legal abortion,” Ms. Gutierrez said, adding
that the justices had rejected his contention
that the law created a “manageable
inconvenience.”
A spokeswoman for Mr. Abbott, Lauren
Bean, said on Tuesday night, “The attorney
general’s office will continue to defend the
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law, just as we defend all state laws when
they are challenged in court.”

regardless of how the Fifth Circuit ultimately
ruled.

Last November, the Supreme Court, in a 5to-4 ruling, rejected a request to intercede in
a separate case challenging the law, one that
centered on the admitting-privileges
requirement. In dissent, Justice Stephen G.
Breyer said he expected the Supreme Court
to agree to hear an appeal in that case

A three-judge panel of the appeals court
upheld the admitting-privileges requirement
in March. On Thursday, the full Fifth Circuit
refused, 12 to 3, to reconsider that ruling. In
light of Justice Breyer’s comment, Supreme
Court review of the admitting-privileges case
appears likely.
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“Court Upholds Texas Limits on Abortion”
The New York Times
Manny Fernandez and Erick Eckholm
June 9, 2015
A federal appellate court upheld some of the
toughest provisions of a Texas abortion law
on Tuesday, putting about half of the state’s
remaining abortion clinics at risk of
permanently shutting their doors and leaving
the nation’s second-most populous state with
fewer than a dozen clinics across its more
than 267,000 square miles. There were 41
when the law was passed.
Abortion providers and women’s rights
groups vowed a quick appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, setting the stage for
what could be the most far-reaching ruling in
years on when legislative restrictions pose an
“undue burden” on the constitutional right to
an abortion.
A three-judge panel of the appellate court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in New Orleans, sided for the most
part with Texas and the abortion law the
Republican-dominated Legislature passed in
2013, known as House Bill 2.
The judges ruled that Texas can require all
abortion clinics in the state to meet the same
building, equipment and staffing standards
that hospital-style surgical centers must meet,
which could force numerous clinics to close,
abortion rights advocates said.
In addition to the surgical standards, the court
upheld a requirement that doctors performing
abortions obtain admitting

privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of a
clinic. The court said that except as applied to
one doctor working in McAllen in South
Texas, the provision did not put an
unconstitutional burden on women seeking
abortions.
Texas lawmakers argued that the provisions
were intended to improve safety. But major
medical associations say these measures do
not improve patient safety, and abortion
rights advocates say they are really intended
to restrict access to abortion.
Under the 1973 Roe v Wade decision and
later cases, the Supreme Court has permitted
a wide array of abortion regulations,
including waiting periods and parental
consent for minors, but said states may not
impose an “undue burden” on the right to an
abortion before a fetus is viable outside the
womb.
Throughout the ruling, the Fifth Circuit
judges cited the explanations given by the
Texas Legislature for what is considered one
of the most restrictive abortions laws in the
country.
“Texas’ stated purpose for enacting H.B. 2
was to provide the highest quality of care to
women seeking abortions and to protect the
health and welfare of women seeking
abortions,” the Fifth Circuit ruling read.
“There is no question that this is a legitimate
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purpose that supports regulating physicians
and the facilities in which they perform
abortions.”
But clinic owners, women’s health groups
and the American Civil Liberties Union said
that if the Fifth Circuit’s decision were to take
effect, the results would be “devastating” for
women seeking abortions in Texas.
“Not since before Roe v. Wade has a law or
court decision had the potential to devastate
access to reproductive health care on such a
sweeping scale,” said Nancy Northup, the
president and chief executive of the Center
for Reproductive Rights, whose lawyers were
part of the legal team representing the clinics
that sued the state. “Once again, women
across the state of Texas face the near total
elimination of safe and legal options for
ending a pregnancy, and the denial of their
constitutional rights.”
The decision by the Fifth Circuit, regarded as
one of the most conservative federal
appellate courts in the country, is expected to
take effect in about 22 days. In the meantime,
however, the clinics and their lawyers plan to
ask the court to stay the decision while they
appeal it. If the Fifth Circuit declines, the
clinic lawyers said, they will seek an
emergency stay from the Supreme Court that
would prevent the ruling from taking effect
while the Supreme Court considered whether
to hear the case.
There are 18 facilities providing abortions in
Texas, and if and when the Fifth Circuit’s
decision goes into effect, eight clinics will
close and 10 facilities are expected to remain

open, largely because they are ambulatory
surgery centers or have relationships with
such centers, according to Dr. Daniel
Grossman, an investigator with the Texas
Policy Evaluation Project and one of the
experts who testified for the clinics in the
case. But the fate of at least one of the
facilities expected to stay open, a clinic in
McAllen in the Rio Grande Valley, remained
uncertain.
Lawyers for the Texas clinics that sued the
state said about 900,000 reproductive-age
women will live more than 150 miles from
the nearest open facility in the state when the
surgical-center requirement and admittingprivileges rule take effect.
The Fifth Circuit panel found that the
percentage of affected women who would
face travel distances of 150 miles or more
amounted to 17 percent, a figure that it said
was not a “large fraction.” An abortion
regulation cannot be invalidated unless it
imposes an undue burden on what the
Supreme Court has termed “a large fraction
of relevant cases.”
Previously, a panel of the same federal
appeals court ruled that Mississippi could not
force its only remaining abortion clinic to
close by arguing that women could always
travel to neighboring states for the procedure.
But the panel in the Texas case on Tuesday
held that the closing of a clinic in El Paso —
which left the nearest in-state clinic some 550
miles to the east — was permissible because
many women had already been traveling to
New Mexico for abortions, and because the
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rule did not close all the abortion clinics in
Texas.
In the case of the McAllen clinic, the sole
abortion provider in the Rio Grande Valley,
Tuesday’s decision held that the distance of
235 miles or more to the nearest clinic did
pose an undue burden. For now, at least, the
Fifth Circuit panel exempted that clinic from
aspects of the surgical-center and admittingprivileges requirements. But Amy Hagstrom
Miller, the chief executive of Whole
Woman’s Health, which runs the McAllen
facility and was one of the abortion providers
that sued the state, said the organization was
evaluating whether the ruling would permit
the clinic to continue operating.

The Texas attorney general, Ken Paxton,
called the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding
the law a “victory for life and women’s
health.”
“H.B. 2 both protects the unborn and ensures
Texas women are not subjected to unsafe and
unhealthy conditions,” Mr. Paxton said in a
statement. “Today’s decision by the Fifth
Circuit validates that the people of Texas
have authority to establish safe, commonsense standards of care necessary to ensure
the health of women.”
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“Texas Abortion Case Reaches the Court”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
June 19, 2015
Abortion clinics and doctors in Texas asked
the Supreme Court on Friday night to delay
enforcement of a 2013 state abortion law
while an appeal to the Justices is pursued.
Without a postponement, the lengthy
application said, more than half of the
existing nineteen clinics in Texas will have to
close on July 1, and some of them might
never reopen.
The delay request was filed with Justice
Antonin Scalia, who handles emergency
legal filings from the geographic region that
includes Texas – the Fifth Circuit. He has the
option of acting on his own or sharing the
issue with his colleagues.
Late Friday afternoon, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused, by a
two-to-one vote, to delay its June 9 ruling
upholding most of the Texas law. It did
modify slightly a part of that ruling in order
to give one clinic — in McAllen, in the Rio
Grande Valley — more time to adapt to the
new restrictions.
Circuit Judge Edward C. Prado would have
put the entire ruling on hold. His two
colleagues, Circuit Judges Jennifer Walker
Elrod and Catharina Haynes, turned down the
challengers’ delay request except for the
temporary reprieve for the McAllen clinic.

the postponement application before then.
The clinics and doctors will be filing a formal
petition for review later, but the Court
probably would not act on that until its next
Term, starting in October. The Justices
expect to finish their current Term at the end
of this month or soon after that.
The Court is currently considering whether to
review an appeal by the state of Mississippi
to put back into effect a state abortion law
that is generally understood will lead to the
closing of the last remaining clinic in that
state.
The Texas case is entirely separate from that
Mississippi dispute. Two provisions of the
Texas law are at issue: a requirement that any
clinic performing abortions must have
facilities equal to those of a surgical center,
and a requirement that any doctor performing
abortions must have patient-admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital.
In asking for a delay of those provisions
Friday, the clinics and doctors told the Court
that the effect of those limitations would
mean a “seventy-five percent reduction in
Texas abortion facilities in just a two-year
period, creating a severe shortage of safe and
legal abortion services in a state that is home
to more than five million reproductive-age
women.”

Because the law is now due to go into effect
in twelve days, the Court is likely to act on
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Before the new law began taking effect, there
were some forty-one abortion clinics
throughout Texas. Some clinics were able to
reopen after the Supreme Court, in a
temporary order last October, put some limits
on the state law’s scope.
Under the new Fifth Circuit ruling, the
application said, nineteen clinics are
currently providing abortion services. But,
without a delay by the Supreme Court of the
lower court decision, it added, ten of those
nineteen would have to close as of July 1. An
eleventh clinic, in McAllen, it said, would be
limited to providing abortions to women in
four counties using a single doctor.
It also said that a twelfth facility that has
applied for a state license in order to reopen
would not be able to do so, under the Fifth
Court ruling.

“The fate of a dozen clinics — and the many
women who would otherwise obtain
abortions at those clinics — will be
determined by the outcome” of the
postponement request, the application added.
The clinics and doctors have insisted all
along that the two provisions they are
challenging are not necessary medically at
abortion clinics, and will only have the effect
of denying access to more women seeking to
end their pregnancies, even for medical
reasons.
Texas has strongly defended the surgical
facilities
and
admitting
privileges
requirements, arguing that they are necessary
to protect women’s health. State officials
probably will get a chance to reply to the
delay application before Justice Scalia or the
full Court acts.
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“Judge Garza Really Disagrees with the Miss. Abortion-Clinic
Opinion”
Find Law
William Peacock
July 31, 2014
A Fifth Circuit panel on Tuesday upheld an
injunction against the enforcement of a
Mississippi statute requiring physicians
providing abortions to have admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital as it applied to
the state's last remaining clinic. It did so
despite binding authority from earlier this
year -- a different panel's decision upholding
a substantially similar law out of Texas.
The majority justified the split from authority
by pointing to a 1938 segregation-ineducation case -- an Equal Protection
holding, even though this is a Due Process
dispute. Circuit Judge Emilio Garza was so
dumbfounded by the majority's reasoning
that his dissent more than doubles the length
of the opinion -- from 18 to 37 pages long.
n his dissent, Garza takes issue with every
single premise in the majority's opinion,
while saving a few pages' worth of wrath
for Planned Parenthood v. Casey itself. We'll
hold off on reiterating his rant, which echoes
many that have come before him (standardless standard of Casey comes from Harlan's
sloppy dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which has
led to decades of sloppy judicial activism
based in politics) and instead look at his
issues with the case at hand.
H.B. 1390 Doesn't Close Clinics (Directly)

Garza starts by noting that this isn't state
action: The law requires physicians to get
admitting privileges -- that's it.
Five hospitals in the area around the clinic
declined to extend those privileges. Hospitals
choosing not to extend privileges is private
action, action which may conflict with
federal law. ("Federal law, however,
prohibits entities receiving certain funding or
contracts from discriminating 'in the
extension of staff or other privileges to any
physician ... because he performed or assisted
in the performance of a lawful sterilization
procedure or abortion ...'") This case isn't
about possibly illegal private action, however
-- it's about review of a state law.
"The independent decisions of private
hospitals have no place in our review of state
action under the Constitution," Judge Garza
wrote.
How Far of a Drive Is Too Far?
Our first reaction to the holding in this case
was, "What about Abbot?" Right or wrong,
the Fifth Circuit, just this past March, upheld
a similar law out of Texas. Judge Garza is
wondering the same thing:
"Applying Casey, a panel of this Court
recently concluded that 'an increase of travel
of less than 150 miles for some women is not
an undue burden,'" Garza wrote. "The
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majority gives these binding principles a
passing nod [...] before setting them aside for
the sole reason that this case happens to
involve the crossing of state borders to obtain
abortion services."
He also took issue with the majority's citation
of Casey as support for the proposition that
crossing state lines is an undue burden on the
right to obtain an abortion:
"In the majority's view, the Casey Court's
failure to 'mention or consider the potential
availability of abortions ... in surrounding
states' implies that we must confine our
undue burden analysis to Mississippi. [...]
Such an inference is legally nonsensical: No
such rule exists. Casey dealt with the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute
imposing various informed consent and
spousal notification requirements on women
seeking abortion services in that state, and the
Court had no occasion to consider abortion
access in nearby states. The lack of a squarely
applicable precedent means only that the
question remains open."
Gaines Is Apples and Oranges
In Gaines, the Supreme Court held that a
state has an obligation "to give the protection
of equal laws" regardless of "what another
State may do or fail to do." (Emphasis in
dissent.)

The key words are "equal" and
"protection:" Gaines "governs each state's
obligations solely under the Equal Protection
Clause, not under the Constitution at large,
much less the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause," Judge Garza
concluded.
Another significant distinction: In Gaines,
the state was dealing with a service that it was
obligated to provide equally: providing an
education to students within its borders.
Here? The state is not, and is not required to,
provide abortions.
We're Going to Need a Bigger Record
Despite the lengthy dissent, Judge Garza
wasn't ready to hand the case to Mississippi
outright. He noted that the correct test would
be to follow Casey andAbbott to see if the
distance traveled would amount to an undue
burden.
Such a test, of course, would almost certainly
come out in Mississippi's favor. As Garza
points out, before the Act's passage, nearly 60
percent of Mississippi women seeking an
abortion already went out of state. Plus, as
Mississippi has been arguing all along,
neighboring out-of-state clinics exist within
driving distance of Jackson.
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“Judges Block Abortion Curb in Mississippi”
The New York Times
Campbell Robertson & Erik Eckholm
July 29, 2014
A federal appeals panel on Tuesday blocked
a Mississippi law that would have shut the
sole abortion clinic in the state by requiring
its doctors to obtain admitting privileges at
local hospitals, something they had been
unable to do.
By a 2-to-1 vote, the panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that by imposing a law that would
effectively end abortion in the state,
Mississippi would illegally shift its
constitutional obligations to neighboring
states. The ruling is the latest at a time when
states, particularly in the South, are
increasingly setting new restrictions that
supporters say address safety issues and that
critics say are intended to shut clinics.
“A state cannot lean on its sovereign
neighbors to provide protection of its
citizens’ federal constitutional rights,” Judge
E. Grady Jolly wrote.
“Pre-viability,
a
woman
has
the
constitutional right to end her pregnancy by
abortion,” he continued. This law
“effectively extinguishes that right within
Mississippi’s borders.”
Mississippi officials had argued that women
seeking abortions could always drive to
neighboring states, such as Louisiana or
Tennessee, to obtain the procedure, an
argument the panel rejected.

The decision did not overturn the Mississippi
law or explore whether the admittingprivilege requirement was justified on safety
grounds. Rather, the panel said, the law could
not be used to close the sole clinic in the state.
The opinion preserved an existing stay while
the substantive issues were considered
further by a Federal District Court. But it set
a clear principle of state responsibility that
the lower court must apply to this case.
Laurence H. Tribe, a professor of
constitutional law at Harvard, said that the
principle of state responsibility enunciated by
the circuit court “is deeply established and
fully entrenched.”
“It goes not only to the issue of reproductive
freedom but to the very character of the
federal union,” he said.
Mississippi officials did not say whether the
state would appeal.
“We are reviewing the ruling and considering
our options,” said Jan Schaefer, a
spokeswoman for Jim Hood, Mississippi’s
attorney general.
State Representative Sam C. Mims, who was
the chief sponsor of the law, expressed
disappointment with the ruling, saying that
the decision reflected a misinterpretation of
its purpose.
“Abortion is still legal throughout the nation
and, of course, still legal in Mississippi,” he
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said. “This legislation did not deal with that;
it only dealt with the regulation of abortion
clinics.”
Supporters of abortion rights were pleased
but wary.
“The fact that the Mississippi clinic can stay
open is good news, but there are a lot of other
cases pending in federal courts, and it’s
impossible to know if those laws will be
upheld or struck down,” said Elizabeth Nash,
who analyzes state laws for the Guttmacher
Institute, a private research group that
supports abortion rights.
Similar laws have been temporarily blocked
by federal courts in Alabama, Kansas and
Wisconsin while they have taken effect in
Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas
and Utah.
In March, a panel from the same appeals
court, composed of different judges, upheld a
Texas law requiring admitting privileges,
ruling that the closing of some but not all
clinics within a state did not present an undue
burden to women seeking abortion. About
one-third of the abortion clinics in Texas
have shut in the last year because of the
requirement, leaving 22 open and forcing
women in some parts of the state to drive
more than 100 miles to obtain an abortion.
On Monday, two affected clinics in Texas are
mounting a new legal challenge and clinic
operators will also ask a Federal District
Court to block enforcement of a more drastic
requirement scheduled to take effect on Sept.
1 — that abortion clinics meet the building
standards of ambulatory surgery centers.

That rule could reduce the number of centers
operating in the state to fewer than 10.
While the Texas and Mississippi laws were
nearly identical, the judges found that the
effect in Mississippi, with a single clinic,
made the law there, passed by a large and
bipartisan majority in 2012, constitutionally
distinct from the one in Texas.
Nearly everyone involved with the law in
Mississippi acknowledged from the outset
that it would shutter the Jackson Women’s
Health Organization, which is north of
downtown Jackson. The clinic’s challenge to
the law was argued by the Center for
Reproductive Rights, a New York group.
Politicians at the time of the law’s passage,
including the governor, welcomed the
closing as a likely outcome. The two
physicians who perform nearly all abortions
at the clinic, neither of whom live full-time in
Jackson, tried and failed to obtain admitting
privileges at all seven hospitals in the area.
When they appeared before the appeals panel
in April, lawyers representing the state did
not dispute that the law would force the
clinic’s closing, instead echoing arguments
made about the Texas law: that it was not an
undue burden for women to have to drive a
longer distance.
Mississippi is “surrounded by major
metropolitan areas where abortion clinics are
available,” said Paul E. Barnes of the
Mississippi attorney general’s office. The
judges at the time pointed out that such
options might narrow considerably with the
passage of similar laws in Louisiana and
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Alabama, a point raised again in a footnote to
Tuesday’s opinion.
In a dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza agreed
with Mississippi’s arguments, saying that the
law was a reasonable effort to regulate and
add safeguards to abortions. Disputing the
central premise of the opinion, he wrote that
“no state is obligated to provide or guarantee
the provision of abortion services within its
borders.”
Major medical associations including the
American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists have said that requiring clinic
doctors to have admitting privileges has no
effect on medical safety. In an emergency,

patients would be sent to local emergency
rooms and be treated by specialists in any
case.
Many hospitals provide admitting privileges
only to doctors who admit a minimum
number of patients each year — a threshold
many abortion providers cannot meet
because serious medical crises are rare and,
in the case of the Jackson clinic, because the
doctors visit from elsewhere.
Other hospitals, especially in conservative
and rural areas, have refused to grant
privileges to abortion clinic doctors in order
to avoid controversy.

426

“Supreme Court Takes No Action on Mississippi Abortion Law”
NBC News
Pete Williams
June 30, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court today took no action
on a dispute over a Mississippi abortion law
that requires doctors performing abortions to
have admitting privileges at local hospitals.
As a result, the law will remain on hold for
several more months — perhaps until the
court decides whether to take a similar law
from Texas. The Supreme Court Monday
blocked enforcement of the Texas law while
it's on appeal.
Passed by the state legislature in 2012, the
Mississippi law was blocked by lower courts,
which found that it would effectively force
the state's only licensed abortion clinic to shut
down.

The state argued that the law would not
unduly burden the right of access to abortion
services, because many women in
Mississippi could go to nearby clinics in
Tennessee, Louisiana, and Alabama. But the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
"Mississippi may not shift its obligation with
respect to the established constitutional rights
of its citizens to another state."
In a more recent ruling, a different panel of
the same appeals court said that requiring
women to leave Texas for abortion services
is not necessarily unconstitutional. That
decision came in the separate dispute over the
2013 Texas abortion law.
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MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem
Ruling Below: MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (D.N.D. 2014)
Plaintiff MKB Management Corporation, doing business as the Red River Women's Clinic, is the
sole abortion provider in North Dakota. Before North Dakota’s H.B. 1456 took effect, the
plaintiffs brought suit in the district court, challenging the law's constitutionality and seeking
injunctive relief. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
of H.B. 1456. The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment, arguing H.B. 1456 violates the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
The district court found that "[a] woman's constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before
viability has consistently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court for more than forty
years since Roe v. Wade.” Concluding that "H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability abortions in
a very significant percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an undue burden on
women seeking to obtain an abortion," the district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, permanently enjoining H.B. 1456. The State now appeals.
Question Presented: Whether North Dakota could prohibit physicians from aborting unborn
children who possessed detectable heartbeats.

MKB MANAGEMENT CORP., doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic; Kathryn L.
Eggleston, M.D.
Plaintiffs – Appellees
v.
Wayne STENEHJEM, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of North
Dakota, et. al.
Defendants – Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed on July 22, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the question whether,
given the current state of medical science, a
state generally may prohibit physicians from
aborting unborn children who possess
detectable heartbeats. The district court held

that it may not. Because United States
Supreme Court precedent does not permit us
to reach a contrary result, we affirm.
I.
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North Dakota has, for a number of years,
prohibited abortion "[a]fter the point in
pregnancy when the unborn child may
reasonably be expected to have reached
viability," except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother. North Dakota
defines "viable" as "the ability of an unborn
child to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid."
In 2013, North Dakota passed House Bill
1456, which extends the general prohibition
on abortion to the point in pregnancy when
the unborn child possesses a detectable
heartbeat. H.B. 1456 contains two operative
provisions. The first requires a physician
performing an abortion to "determin[e], in
accordance with standard medical practice, if
the unborn child the pregnant woman is
carrying has a detectable heartbeat." This
requirement does not apply "when a medical
emergency exists that prevents compliance."
A physician who violates the heartbeat
testing requirement is subject to disciplinary
action before the state board of medical
examiners.

Dakota. Plaintiff Dr. Kathryn Eggelston is a
board-certified family medicine physician,
licensed to practice in North Dakota, who
serves as the Clinic's medical director and
provides abortions to the Clinic's patients.
The defendants are the State's Attorney for
the county in which the Clinic is located, the
North Dakota Attorney General, and the
members of the North Dakota Board of
Medical Examiners, all in their official
capacities (collectively, the "State").

The second operative provision prohibits a
physician from performing an abortion on a
pregnant woman if the unborn child has a
"heartbeat [that] has been detected according
to the requirements of section 1." There are
exceptions for the life or health of the
pregnant woman and for the life of another
unborn child. A physician who violates this
provision commits a felony. The pregnant
woman, however, is not subject to liability.

Before H.B. 1456 took effect, the plaintiffs
brought suit in the district court, challenging
the law's constitutionality and seeking
injunctive relief. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of H.B. 1456. The plaintiffs
then moved for summary judgment, arguing
H.B. 1456 violates the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs
submitted declarations from Dr. Eggleston
and Dr. Christie Iverson, a board-certified
obstetrician and gynecologist licensed in
North Dakota, both stating that fetal cardiac
activity is detectable by about 6 weeks and
that a fetus is not viable until about 24 weeks.
In response, the State submitted the
declaration of Dr. Jerry Obritsch, a boardcertified obstetrician and gynecologist
licensed in North Dakota, that an unborn
child's heartbeat is detectable by about 6 to 8
weeks and that an unborn child is viable from
conception because in vitro fertilization
("IVF") "allow[s] an embryonic unborn child
to live outside the human uterus (womb) for
2 - 6 days after conception."

Plaintiff MKB Management Corporation,
doing business as the Red River Women's
Clinic, is the sole abortion provider in North

The district court found that "[a] woman's
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy
before viability has consistently been upheld
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by the United States Supreme Court for more
than forty years since Roe v. Wade." It
reasoned that "the affidavit of Dr. Obritsch
does not create a genuine issue [as to when
viability occurs] primarily because Dr.
Obritsch uses a different definition of
viability than the one used by either the
United States Supreme Court or the medical
community generally." Concluding that
"H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability
abortions in a very significant percentage of
cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an
undue burden on women seeking to obtain an
abortion," the district court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs, permanently
enjoining H.B. 1456. The State now appeals.
II.
We review the district court's grant of
summary judgment de novo and its
permanent injunction for an abuse of
discretion.
The State argues that the Supreme Court has
called into question the continuing validity of
its abortion jurisprudence, and that changes
in the facts underlying Roe and Casey require
us to overturn those cases.
The evolution in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence
reflects
its
increasing
recognition of states' profound interest in
protecting unborn children. In 1973, the
Court announced it would regulate abortion
according to the trimester framework.
Although Roe acknowledged there were
"important state interests in regulation," it
prohibited states from issuing regulations
designed to promote their interest in

"protecting potential life" during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy.
By 1992, however, a plurality of the Court
had rejected the trimester framework because
it failed to "fulfill Roe's own promise that the
State has an interest in protecting fetal life or
potential life." Casey recognized "there is a
substantial state interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy." To give this interest
due consideration, Casey replaced Roe's
trimester framework with the undue burden
analysis, under which a state may promote its
interest in potential life by regulating
abortion before viability so long as the
regulation's "purpose or effect is [not] to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion."
Most recently, a majority of the Court, when
presented with an opportunity to reaffirm
Casey, chose instead merely to "assume"
Casey's principles for the purposes of its
opinion. This mere assumption may, as the
State suggests, signal the Court's willingness
to reevaluate its abortion jurisprudence.
Even so, the Court has yet to overrule the Roe
and Casey line of cases. Thus we, as an
intermediate court, are bound by those
decisions. Neither Gonzales's signal nor the
alleged change of underlying facts empowers
us to overrule the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we have no choice but to follow
the majority of the Court in assuming the
following principles for the purposes of this
opinion:
Before viability, a State "may not
prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her
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pregnancy." It also may not impose
upon this right an undue burden,
which exists if a regulation's "purpose
or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability." On the other hand,
"[r]egulations which do no more than
create a structural mechanism by
which the State, or the parent or
guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a
substantial obstacle to the woman's
exercise of the right to choose."

importance of the parties, particularly the
state, developing the record in a meaningful
way so as to present a real opportunity for the
court to examine viability." Here, the
plaintiffs' declarations, by Drs. Eggleston and
Iverson, state viability occurs at about 24
weeks. Dr. Iverson explained she understands
viability to mean "the time when a fetus has
a reasonable chance for sustained life outside
the womb, albeit with lifesaving medical
intervention." Iverson Dec. at 2. This
definition is in accordance with the one
adopted by the Supreme Court.

Here, because the parties do not dispute that
fetal heartbeats are detectable at about 6
weeks, it is clear that H.B. 1456 generally
prohibits abortions after that point in a
pregnancy. Whether such a prohibition is
permissible under the principles we accept as
controlling in this case depends on when
viability occurs: if viability occurs at about
24 weeks, as the plaintiffs maintain, then
H.B. 1456 impermissibly prohibits women
from making the ultimate decision to
terminate their pregnancies; but if viability
occurs at conception, as the State argues, then
no impermissible prohibition ensues.

The State's declaration, by Dr. Obritsch,
contends viability occurs at conception
because IVF "allow[s] an embryonic unborn
child to live outside the human uterus
(womb) for 2 - 6 days after conception."
Obritsch Dec. at 8. While this declaration
provides some support for the State's
argument, we agree with the district court
that Dr. Obrtisch's definition of viability
differs from the Supreme Court's and thus
does not create a genuine dispute as to when
viability occurs.

Just as we are bound by the Supreme Court's
assumption of Casey's principles, we are also
bound by the Court's statement that viability
is the time "when, in the judgment of the
attending physician on the particular facts of
the case before him, there is a reasonable
likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival
outside the womb, with or without artificial
support."
When we recently reviewed an Arkansas
statute similar to H.B. 1456, we noted "the

Because there is no genuine dispute that H.B.
1456 generally prohibits abortions before
viability—as the Supreme Court has defined
that concept—and because we are bound by
Supreme Court precedent holding that states
may not prohibit pre-viability abortions, we
must affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
III.
Although controlling Supreme Court
precedent dictates the outcome in this case,
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good reasons exist for the Court to reevaluate
its jurisprudence.
A.
To begin, the Court's viability standard has
proven unsatisfactory because it gives too
little consideration to the "substantial state
interest in potential life throughout
pregnancy." By deeming viability "the point
at which the balance of interests tips," the
Court has tied a state's interest in unborn
children to developments in obstetrics, not to
developments in the unborn. This leads to
troubling consequences for states seeking to
protect unborn children. For example,
although "states in the 1970s lacked the
power to ban an abortion of a 24-week-oldfetus because that fetus would not have
satisfied the viability standard of that time,
[t]oday . . . that same fetus would be
considered viable, and states would have the
power to restrict [such] abortions." How it is
consistent with a state's interest in protecting
unborn children that the same fetus would be
deserving of state protection in one year but
undeserving of state protection in another is
not clear. The Supreme Court has posited
there
are
"logical
and
biological
justifications" for choosing viability as the
critical point. But this choice is better left to
the states, which might find their interest in
protecting unborn children better served by a
more consistent and certain marker than
viability. Here, the North Dakota legislature
has determined that the critical point for
asserting its interest in potential life is the
point at which an unborn child possesses a
detectable heartbeat. "To substitute its own
preference to that of the legislature in this
area is not the proper role of a court."

By taking this decision away from the states,
the Court has also removed the states' ability
to account for "advances in medical and
scientific technology [that] have greatly
expanded our knowledge of prenatal life,"
"[B]ecause the Court's rulings have rendered
basic abortion policy beyond the power of
our legislative bodies, the arms of
representative
government
may
not
meaningfully debate" medical and scientific
advances. Thus the Court's viability standard
fails to fulfill Roe's "promise that the State
has an interest in protecting fetal life or
potential life."
Medical and scientific advances further show
that the concept of viability is itself subject to
change. The Court has already acknowledged
that viability continues to occur earlier in
pregnancy. When the Court decided Roe in
1973, viability generally occurred at 28
weeks. In 1992, viability "sometimes"
occurred at 23 to 24 weeks. Today, viability
generally occurs at 24 weeks, but it may
occur weeks earlier. Dr. Obritsch's
declaration, although insufficient to create a
genuine dispute of fact in the face of the
Supreme Court's current definition of
viability, shows the concept of viability may
be attacked from the point of conception
forward, as well. As IVF and similar
technologies improve, we can reasonably
expect the amount of time an "embryonic
unborn child" may survive outside the womb
will only increase. The viability standard will
prove even less workable in the future.
B.
Another reason for the Court to reevaluate its
jurisprudence is that the facts underlying Roe
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and Casey may have changed. The State has
presented evidence to that effect and the
plaintiffs did not contest this evidence at the
summary judgment stage. The State's
evidence "goes to the heart of the balance Roe
struck between the choice of a mother and the
life of her unborn child." First, "Roe's
assumption that the decision to abort a baby
will be made in close consultation with a
woman's private physician is called into
question by" declarations from women who
have had abortions. These declarations state
women may receive abortions without
consulting the physician beforehand and
without receiving follow-up care after, that
women may not be given information about
the abortion procedure or its possible
complications, and that the abortion clinic
may function "like a mill." The declaration by
Dr. John Thorp, a board-certified obstetrician
and gynecologist, further states that
"coercion or pressure prior to the termination
of pregnancy occurs with frequency." One
woman declared her husband threatened to
kick her out of the house and take her
children away forever if she did not abort a
pregnancy that was the product of an affair.
The declarations from women who have had
abortions also show abortions may cause
adverse consequences for the woman's health
and well-being. One woman reported that
"[t]he negative effects of my abortion
resulted in ten years of mental and emotional
torment." Another reported she "suffered for
years from depression, anxiety, panic attacks,
low self-esteem" and "suicidal ideation." Yet
another reported her abortion caused
"numerous female health issues, including an
ectopic
pregnancy,
chronic
bladder
infections, debilitating menstrual cycles,

cervical cancer and early hysterectomy." Dr.
Obritsch also explained some studies support
a connection between abortion and breast
cancer.
We further observe that the pseudonymously
named plaintiffs in two of the Supreme
Court's foundational abortion cases later
advocated against those very decisions.
Norma McCorvey, the "Jane Roe" of Roe v.
Wade, sought relief from the judgment in her
case on the ground that changed factual and
legal circumstances rendered Roe unjust.
Roe's companion case, similarly sought relief
from the judgment in her case. Cano also
filed an amicus brief in this case arguing "that
abortion is psychologically damaging to the
mental and social health of significant
numbers of women." McCorvey's and Cano's
renunciations call into question the
soundness of the factual assumptions of the
cases purportedly decided in their favor.
Finally, the State argues that, by enacting a
law that permits parents to abandon
unwanted infants at hospitals without
consequence, it has reduced the burden of
child care that the Court identified in Roe. In
short, the continued application of the
Supreme Court's viability standard discounts
the legislative branch's recognized interest in
protecting unborn children.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment to
the plaintiffs and the permanent injunction of
H.B. 1456.
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“Abortion and the Law: The Eighth Circuit Court Embarrasses
Itself”
The Economist
August 5, 2015
Last month, Judge Bobby Shepherd of the
eighth circuit court in Missouri wrote an
opinion reading more like a novice highschool debate speech than a ruling by a
federal appellate judge. The topic was
abortion—specifically, North Dakota’s
highly restrictive law banning the procedure
at the first sign of a fetal heartbeat. Since a
heartbeat can be heard as early as six weeks
into a pregnancy, and the Supreme Court has
said that women have a right to an abortion
up to the point of viability (i.e., when the
fetus is capable of surviving outside the
womb, around 24 weeks), Judge Shepherd
held, along with two colleagues, that the law
is unconstitutional. But the 14-page ruling
closed with a five-page lament: North
Dakota’s law may be inconsistent with Roe v
Wade and Casey v Planned Parenthood, but
the Supreme Court should “re-evaluate its
jurisprudence”.
Lower courts are not in the habit of chiding
the Supreme Court so brazenly for getting it
wrong. But this opinion is most shocking for
the tortured logic and dubious claims fueling
its final five pages.
The three-judge panel begins by claiming
that the viability standard “has proven
unsatisfactory because it gives too little
consideration to the ‘substantial state interest
in potential life throughout pregnancy’”. The
quotation is from the Casey decision, when

the Supreme Court abandoned Roe’s
trimester approach and focused squarely on
viability as the point at which a state’s
interest in fetal life becomes “compelling”
and, thus, when abortion bans become
permissible. But to say that this tipping point
“gives too little consideration” to the state’s
interest in potential life is to ignore what’s on
the other side of the balance: a right of
women to terminate their pregnancies, rooted
in the 14th Amendment’s protection of
personal liberty in the due-process clause.
Judge Shepherd says the “choice” of when to
restrict abortion “is better left to the states,
which might find their interest in protecting
unborn children better served by a more
consistent and certain marker than viability.”
He then declares that North Dakota’s
marker—“the point at which an unborn child
possesses a detectable heartbeat”—is as good
a choice as any. A couple of sentences earlier,
Judge Shepherd had dismissed viability as
“tied” to “developments in obstetrics, not to
developments in the unborn.” Now he
implies that a woman’s right to an abortion
may be made contingent on developments in
fetal-heartbeat-detection technology. And he
finds no trouble with a national picture where
North Dakotans have a handful of weeks to
make a decision about their pregnancies—or
even less, since it can take a month or more
for women to realise they are pregnant—
while residents of other states have three or
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four times that long to consider their options.
The court seems fine with the scope of
constitutional rights being defined by where
one happens to live.

woman declared her husband threatened to
kick her out of the house and take her
children away forever if she did not abort a
pregnancy that was the product of an affair.”

It gets worse. The opinion then calls into
question the very meaning of “viability”,
turning to the state’s witness, Dr Jerry
Obritsch, who claims that “an unborn child is
viable from conception because in vitro
fertilization (“IVF”) ‘allow[s] an embryonic
unborn child to live outside the human uterus
(womb) for 2 - 6 days after conception.’”
While the panel notes this view of viability is
clearly at odds with the Supreme Court’s
conception, it contends that Dr Obritsch
“shows the concept of viability may be
attacked from the point of conception
forward, as well.” But an embryo is not
“viable” just because it is able to survive for
a few days before being implanted in a uterus.
Test-tube babies do not self-gestate in the
vial. For the eighth circuit to endorse the state
witness's sophistry—even haltingly—is an
embarrassment of judicial reasoning.

Leaving aside the dubious I-have-a-singleexpert-who-says-this mode of establishing
empirical truths—the logic behind these
arguments is mystifying. Are women less
entitled to their constitutional rights if they
happen to be married to an abusive husband?
Or if their health provider isn’t as attentive as
they may like? Does a constitutional right
exercised imperfectly no longer merit
protection? By that odd measure, the free
exercise of religion is called into serious
question when we discover that some Amish
youth sell methamphetamines. Free speech
should perhaps be abandoned because
dogfight videographers and cross burners
abuse it. And the second amendment’s right
to bear arms should have been shunted to the
dustbin right after America’s first mass
shooting—or at least well before its 71st.

The strangest string of arguments to win the
eighth-circuit panel’s imprimatur concerns
the purported reality of abortion in America
today. Some women have abortions without
adequate medical consultation, Judge
Shepherd writes, and some receive no followup care after the procedure. The opinion
again cites Dr Obritsch—“a board-certified
obstetrician and gynecologist”—who reports
that “coercion or pressure” often influence a
woman’s decision to have an abortion: “One

The eighth circuit's opinion—which Slate's
Dahlia
Lithwick
rightly
finds
"astonishing"—aims to give the states a free
hand in policing abortion however they
choose, and may encourage abortion
opponents to keep pressing their case to
reverse over four decades of abortion
jurisprudence. But it is hard to imagine that
even the most conservative Supreme Court
justices will manage to read the opinion
without wincing.
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“Eighth Circuit Calls for Supreme Court to Reconsider Abortion
Precedents”
The National Review
Ed Whelan
July 23, 2015
In a decision yesterday (MKB Management
Corp. v. Stenehjem), a unanimous Eighth
Circuit panel ruled that a North Dakota law
that generally prohibits abortion after the
point at which the “unborn child the pregnant
woman is carrying has a detectable
heartbeat” is inconsistent with the rules
imposed by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey (1992). Specifically, “fetal heartbeats
are detectable at about 6 weeks”—long
before “viability,” as the Court has defined
that concept. The panel’s reasoning strikes
me as clearly correct.
To their great credit, the panel—consisting of
Lavenski R. Smith, William Duane Benton,
and Bobby E. Shepherd (all Bush 43
appointees)—did not stop there. Instead, they
go on, in pages 9 to 13 of the opinion
authored by Shepherd, to observe and explain
that “good reasons exist for the Court to
reevaluate its [abortion] jurisprudence.”
Some excerpts:
To begin, the Court’s viability
standard has proven unsatisfactory
because
it
gives
too
little
consideration to the “substantial state
interest in potential life throughout
pregnancy.” By deeming viability
“the point at which the balance of
interests tips,” the Court has tied a
state’s interest in unborn children to
developments in obstetrics, not to

developments in the unborn. This
leads to troubling consequences for
states seeking to protect unborn
children. For example, although
“states in the 1970s lacked the power
to ban an abortion of a 24-week-oldfetus because that fetus would not
have satisfied the viability standard of
that time, [t]oday . . . that same fetus
would be considered viable, and
states would have the power to
restrict [such] abortions.” How it is
consistent with a state’s interest in
protecting unborn children that the
same fetus would be deserving of
state protection in one year but
undeserving of state protection in
another is not clear. The Supreme
Court has posited there are “logical
and biological justifications” for
choosing viability as the critical
point. But this choice is better left to
the states, which might find their
interest in protecting unborn children
better served by a more consistent and
certain marker than viability.…
Another reason for the Court to
reevaluate its jurisprudence is that the
facts underlying Roe and Casey may
have changed.… First, “Roe’s
assumption that the decision to abort
a baby will be made in close
consultation with a woman’s private
physician is called into question by”
declarations from women who have
had abortions. The declaration by Dr.
John Thorp, a board-certified
obstetrician and gynecologist, further
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states that “coercion or pressure prior
to the termination of pregnancy
occurs with frequency.” … The
declarations from women who have
had abortions also show abortions
may cause adverse consequences for
the woman’s health and well-being.
Mike Paulsen has compellingly argued that
lower-court judges should disregard Supreme
Court rulings that they in good faith regard as
unconstitutional and instead leave it to the
Court “to do its own dirty work” of enforcing
its lies about the Constitution. The Eighth
Circuit panel doesn’t take that approach, but
it does the next best thing.
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“When Will the Supreme Court Stop Avoiding Abortion?”
Slate
Dahlia Lithwick
June 17, 2015
On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to revive a major abortion provision
from North Carolina that would have
required any woman seeking an abortion to
submit to a mandatory ultrasound while
doctors or technicians showed the images of
the scan while describing the fetus in detail,
whether or not the patient wished to hear or
see it or the doctor wished to show or say it.
The law passed in 2011 over the veto of then–
Gov. Bev Perdue. The law contained no
exception for rape, incest, serious health risks
to the patient, or cases of severe fetal
anomalies.
In refusing to hear the appeal, the court left in
place the ruling from the U.S. 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals, which had struck down the
provision, finding that it violated the First
Amendment rights of physicians who were
being “compelled” to speak. That means that,
at least in the states covered by the 4th Circuit
(Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia), these types of
forced “display and describe” provisions are
unconstitutional. They remain permissible in
other jurisdictions that have upheld these
types of requirements. Both the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the 5th and 8th Circuits have
upheld similar laws, relying on language
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, requiring
a physician to advise her pre-abortion patient
of the gestational age of her fetus and provide
printed information about the risks of
abortion and other services. Courts that

upheld the “display and describe” laws
determined that there was little substantial
difference between the information provided
by physicians in Casey and the “display and
describe” requirements in the new laws. The
4th Circuit disagreed, finding that the
requirement had the effect of “transforming
the physician into the mouthpiece of the
state,” which “undermines the trust that is
necessary for facilitating healthy doctorpatient relationships and, through them,
successful treatment outcomes.”
As Jessica Mason Pieklo noted, this
represents the second time that the Supreme
Court has refused to hear a mandatory
ultrasound case. This suggests that while the
court may not yet be ready to wade into the
thicket of determining what an “undue
burden” truly means, the justices continue to
believe that any speech restriction (or
compulsion) is a bad thing, full stop.
With the North Carolina provision fully
ducked, court-watchers now turn their
attention to several other abortion regulations
that are poised to be taken up at the high
court, perhaps as early as this coming fall.
Two challenges still loom large: The court is
currently trying to decide whether to take up
a case about a Mississippi admitting
privileges law, struck down by the 5th Circuit,
that could have the effect of closing down the
only abortion clinic left in the state. As
ThinkProgress notes, “When the bill was
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introduced and passed, politicians in
Mississippi openly admitted that the law was
specifically designed to close the last clinic in
the state.” A question the justices must
attempt to answer is whether a state can
completely eliminate women’s ability to
exercise a constitutional right because they
can exercise it in other states. In the
Mississippi appeals court, the judges cited the
constitutional principle that a state can’t
violate a citizen’s rights by claiming she can
go out of state to exercise it elsewhere.
The court is also looking down the barrel of a
challenge to two parts of HB2, the famous
2013 Texas anti-abortion law that required
providers to obtain admitting privileges to
local hospitals and that forced clinics to be
retrofitted to meet surgical center standards.
Those provisions were upheld by the 5th
Circuit last week. Under the ruling, all but
seven Texas abortion providers may be
forced to shutter—in a state that is home to
27 million people. The federal appeals court
made just one exception, for McAllen, Texas,
where only one clinic serves a significant
portion of South Texas. The court determined
that should the clinic in McAllen be forced to
close, women would have to drive 235 miles
to obtain an abortion, which would prove a
substantial obstacle to getting an abortion.
The 5th Circuit ruling goes into effect on July
1, unless that court agrees to take another
look or the Supreme Court intervenes, which
it did last fall, with an earlier decision about
the clinic requirements of that same omnibus
legislation. Back then, the court put a
temporary hold on the law while the litigation
played out. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,

Kagan, and Sotomayor suggested they were
ready to hear the Texas appeal.
At this point the “undue burden” test from
Casey has become something akin to a
judicial Rorschach test, and even pro-choice
supporters wary of another trip to the high
court have become persuaded that absent a
definitive ruling from the justices, the
standard will continue to mean whatever the
reviewing court wants it to mean. The court
has been dodging reproductive rights cases
for years now, but as the appeals courts
continue their judicial multicar pileup, and
especially if they continue to arrive at
contradictory results, it begins to look more
and more likely that the court will simply
have to weigh in. As Professor Michael Dorf
told the New York Times last week, the high
court heard about 20 abortion cases from
1973 to 1992. They heard only three abortion
cases in the 23 years since. Dorf suggests that
the issue has simply been too charged and
divisive to persuade the justices to jump in. It
may now be inevitable.
For opponents of reproductive rights, the
hope is that Justice Anthony Kennedy is
finally ready to do what he couldn’t bring
himself to do in Casey—yank the breathing
tube out of Roe v. Wade once and for all. For
supporters of reproductive rights, the
decision of the court to avoid hearing the
North Carolina ultrasound case offers a
filament of comfort: Maybe the court wants
to wait just a little bit longer. As Robin Marty
argues here, perhaps the court’s refusal to
hear the North Carolina ultrasound case
means the justices are content to sit back a
little longer and let this whole mess play out
in the state and lower federal courts. Still the
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reign of confusion and the patchwork of
judicial decisions create uncertainty. And the
fact that Texas is poised to close almost all of
its remaining clinics in the coming weeks
creates a new sense of urgency.
There’s one more consideration. As Pema
Levy argued last week at Mother Jones, polls
show that public support for basic access to
reproductive rights seems to have increased
somewhat of late: “Last month, Gallup
reported an upswing in pro-choice sentiment
in the last year. On the 40th anniversary of
Roe v. Wade in 2013, a Wall Street
Journal/NBC News poll found that a record
70 percent of Americans believed that
landmark ruling should stand.” That means
that if the court agrees to take an abortion
case right at the heart of primary season, it

could be setting up the issue as a big fat loser
for the GOP. Far be it from me to suggest that
the justices take that kind of political calculus
into account when planning their electionyear dockets, but do the court’s conservatives
really want to use this fall to force GOP
candidates to own the worst anti-choice
stereotypes? The Texas case, in which the
appeals court judges assumed that women
have the time and money to drive their
convertibles hundreds of miles across the
state to obtain basic reproductive care,
promises to be the unholy stepchild of Mitt
Romney’s greatest hits: a place where
“binders full of women” meets the blithe
unconcern of the 1 percent.
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Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell
Ruling Below: Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D.
Colo. 2013)
In this case, Catholic religious organizations challenge the regulations implementing the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, specifically the requirement that group
health care plans provide all women coverage for certain preventative contraception services
without a co-payment or deductible.
Question Presented: Whether (a) the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and its implementing
regulations did not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise or violate plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights; (b) whether the ACA's accommodation scheme relieved plaintiffs of their
obligations under the contraception mandate, and did not substantially burden their religious
exercise under the RFRA; (c) whether plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim under the
Free Exercise Clause.

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR THE AGED, Denver, Colorado, a
Colorado non-profit corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs – Appellees
v.
Sylvia Matthews BURWELL, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, et al.,
Defendants - Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Filed on July 14, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MATHESON, Circuit Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Affordable Care
Act ("ACA") in 2010, it built upon the
widespread use of employer-based health
insurance in the United States. The ACA and
its implementing regulations require
employers who provide health insurance
coverage to their employees to include

coverage for certain types of preventive care
without cost to the insured. The appeals
before us concern the regulations that require
group health plans to cover contraceptive
services for women as a form of preventive
care ("Mandate").
In response to religious concerns, the
Departments implementing the ACA—
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), Labor,
and Treasury—adopted a regulation that
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exempts religious employers—churches and
their integrated auxiliaries—from covering
contraceptives. When religious non-profit
organizations complained about their
omission
from this
exemption,
the
Departments adopted a regulation that allows
them to opt out of providing, paying for, or
facilitating contraceptive coverage. Under
this regulation, a religious non-profit
organization can opt out by delivering a form
to their group health plan's health insurance
issuer or third-party administrator ("TPA") or
by sending a notification to HHS.

Reaching
Sebelius.

Souls

International,

Inc.

v.

II. HOBBY LOBBY AND THIS CASE

The Plaintiffs in the cases before us are
religious non-profit organizations. They
contend that complying with the Mandate or
the accommodation scheme imposes a
substantial burden on their religious exercise.
The Plaintiffs argue the Mandate [12] and
the accommodation scheme violate the
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
("RFRA") and the Religion and Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment.

Last year, the Supreme Court decided
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., in
which closely-held for-profit corporations
challenged the Mandate under RFRA. The
difference between Hobby Lobby and this
case is significant and frames the issue here.
In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff for-profit
corporations objected on religious grounds to
providing contraceptive coverage and could
choose only between (1) complying with the
ACA by providing the coverage or (2) not
complying and paying significant penalties.
In the cases before us, the plaintiff religious
non-profit organizations can avail themselves
of an accommodation that allows them to opt
out of providing contraceptive coverage
without penalty. Plaintiffs contend the
process to opt out substantially burdens their
religious exercise.

Although we recognize and respect the
sincerity of Plaintiffs' beliefs and arguments,
we conclude the accommodation scheme
relieves Plaintiffs of their obligations under
the Mandate and does not substantially
burden their religious exercise under RFRA
or infringe upon their First Amendment
rights. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a), we affirm the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction to
the plaintiffs in Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, and reverse
the district courts' grants of a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiffs in Southern
Nazarene University v. Sebelius, and

In other words, unlike in Hobby Lobby, the
Plaintiffs do not challenge the general
obligation under the ACA to provide
contraceptive coverage. They instead
challenge the process they must follow to get
out of complying with that obligation. The
Plaintiffs do not claim the Departments have
not tried to accommodate their religious
concerns. They claim the Departments'
attempt is inadequate because the acts
required to opt out of the Mandate
substantially burden their religious exercise.
As we discuss more fully below, however,
the accommodation relieves Plaintiffs of
their obligation to provide, pay for, or
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facilitate contraceptive coverage, and does so
without substantially burdening their
religious
exercise.
III. BACKGROUND
[Section detailing the ACA omitted]
1. Little Sisters of the Poor
The Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the
Aged, Denver, Colorado and Little Sisters of
the Poor, Baltimore ("Little Sisters") belong
to an order of Catholic nuns who devote their
lives to care for the elderly. The Little Sisters
provide health insurance coverage to their
employees through the Christian Brothers
Employee Benefit Trust ("Trust"), a selfinsured church plan that is not subject to
ERISA. The Trust uses Christian Brothers
Services ("Christian Brothers"), another
Catholic organization, as its TPA.
The Little Sisters have always excluded
coverage of sterilization, contraception, and
abortifacients from their health care plan in
accordance with their religious belief that
deliberately avoiding reproduction through
medical means is immoral. The Little Sisters
"believe that it is wrong for them to
intentionally facilitate the provision of these
medical procedures, drugs, devices, and
related counseling and services." They cite
"well-established Catholic teaching that
prohibits encouraging, supporting, or
partnering with others in the provision of
sterilization, contraception, and abortion."
LS Br. at 9-10. The Little Sisters contend they
"cannot provide these things, take actions
that directly cause others to provide them, or

otherwise appear to participate in the
government's delivery scheme," as the mere
appearance of condoning these services
"would violate their public witness to the
sanctity of human life and human dignity and
could mislead other Catholics and the
public."
The Little Sisters are subject to the Mandate
unless they take advantage of the
accommodation scheme by delivering the
Form to the Christian Brothers, their TPA, or
notifying HHS of their religious objection. If
they do not take one of these steps and do not
provide contraceptive coverage, they
estimate a single Little Sisters home could
incur penalties of up to $2.5 million per year,
and allege the Trust could lose up to $130
million in plan contributions. The Little
Sisters
plaintiffs
object
that
the
accommodation scheme violates their
sincerely held religious beliefs because they
cannot take actions that directly cause others
to provide contraception or appear to
participate in the Departments' delivery
scheme.
****
2. Procedural History
The district courts reached different results in
the three cases before us, denying a
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in
Little Sisters but granting a preliminary
injunction to the plaintiffs in Southern
Nazarene and Reaching Souls. Reviewing the
reasoning behind their determinations
clarifies the claims before us on appeal.
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In Little Sisters, the district court determined
that complying with the accommodation
scheme would not impose a substantial
burden on the Little Sisters' or Christian
Brothers' religious exercise. The court's
analysis of the preliminary injunction factors
began and ended by examining whether the
plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if
the requested relief were denied. After
determining it was the court's duty to
determine how the regulations operate as a
matter of law, the court concluded the
accommodation scheme does not require the
Little Sisters to provide contraceptive
coverage or to participate in the provision of
contraceptive coverage.
The court noted that the Little Sisters—
unlike the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby—could
be relieved of the obligation to provide
coverage by signing and delivering the Form
to their TPA, the Christian Brothers. The
court underscored that, while the
Departments could require the Little Sisters
to sign and deliver the Form to their TPA to
avoid the Mandate, the Departments lacked
enforcement authority under ERISA to levy
fines or otherwise force the Christian
Brothers to provide contraceptive coverage
as the TPA for a self-insured, ERISA-exempt
church plan. The court concluded that
requiring the Little Sisters to sign and deliver
the Form to opt out did not constitute a
substantial burden on their religious exercise
and declined to issue a preliminary
injunction.
The Little Sisters next asked the Tenth
Circuit for an injunction pending appeal,
which this court denied. The Supreme Court

subsequently granted their request for an
injunction pending appeal, allowing the Little
Sisters to notify HHS of their religious
objection instead of sending the Form to their
TPA as the regulations at the time required.
The Little Sisters now appeal the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
IV.
UNUSUAL
NATURE
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM

OF

Before we present our analysis of the issues,
we wish to highlight the unusual nature of
Plaintiffs' central claim, which attacks the
Government's attempt to accommodate
religious exercise by providing a means to
opt out of compliance with a generally
applicable law.
Most religious liberty claimants allege that a
generally applicable law or policy without a
religious exception burdens religious
exercise, and they ask courts to strike down
the law or policy or excuse them from
compliance. Our circuit's three most recent
RFRA cases fall into this category. In Hobby
Lobby, the ACA required the plaintiffs to
provide their employees with health
insurance coverage of contraceptives against
their religious beliefs. In Yellowbear v.
Lampert, a prison policy denied the plaintiff
access to a sweat lodge, where he wished to
exercise his Native American religion. In
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, a prison policy
denied the plaintiff a halal diet, which is
necessary to his Muslim religious exercise. In
each instance, the law or policy failed to
provide an exemption or accommodation to
the plaintiff(s).
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The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Holt v.
Hobbs, which concerned a prison ban on
inmates' growing beards, is another recent
example of the more common RFRA claim.
The plaintiff in Holt sought to grow a beard
in accordance with his Muslim faith. In Holt,
like in Hobby Lobby, the government
defendants insisted on a complete restriction
and did not attempt to accommodate the
plaintiff's religious exercise. The plaintiff in
Holt proposed a compromise—he would be
allowed to grow only a half-inch beard—
which the prison refused. The Court
ultimately approved this compromise in its
ruling.

use in a tribal religious ceremony. The Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act
forbids killing a bald eagle, but an applicant
can obtain a permit to "take" a live eagle for
a religious ceremony. We recognized the
potential question of "whether it substantially
burdens Mr. Friday's religion to require him
to obtain a permit in advance of taking an
eagle.” We said we were "skeptical that the
bare requirement of obtaining a permit can be
regarded as a 'substantial burden' under
RFRA," but Mr. Friday did not make that
specific argument, and we decided the permit
accommodation otherwise met RFRA's strict
scrutiny element.

In the cases before us, by contrast, the
Departments have developed a religious
accommodation rather than leaving it for the
courts to fashion judicial relief. Plaintiffs not
only challenge a law that requires them to
provide contraceptive coverage against their
religious beliefs, they challenge the
exception that the law affords to them. The
precedents Plaintiffs cite are instructive in
some respects, but none of them involve a
situation where the government offers
religious objectors an accommodation. The
Supreme Court and this circuit have
suggested such accommodations might have
eliminated or lessened burdens we otherwise
deemed substantial. Until now, however, we
have not squarely considered a RFRA
challenge to a religious accommodation.

We spoke favorably of the government's
accommodation scheme in Friday, even
though "[t]hat accommodation may be more
burdensome than the [religious objectors]
would prefer, and may sometimes
subordinate their interests to other policies
not of their choosing.” As we noted in
conclusion: "Law accommodates religion; it
cannot wholly exempt religion from the reach
of the law. We therefore turn to uncharted
Tenth Circuit terrain.

The closest Tenth Circuit case we have found
is United States v. Friday, in which defendant
Winslow Friday argued his conviction for
shooting a bald eagle without a permit
violated RFRA because he shot the eagle for

****
The Plaintiffs in the three cases before us
assert claims against the Mandate and
accommodation scheme under RFRA and the
First
Amendment's
Free
Exercise,
Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses.
Because we determine the accommodation
scheme relieves Plaintiffs from complying
with the Mandate and does not substantially
burden their religious exercise under RFRA
or infringe upon their First Amendment
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rights, we affirm the district court's denial of
a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in
Little Sisters and reverse the district courts'
grants of a preliminary injunction to the
plaintiffs in Southern Nazarene and Reaching
Souls.
V. RFRA
Under RFRA, the government "shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability" unless "it
demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."
Plaintiffs argue the ACA and its
implementing regulations violate RFRA
because they substantially burden their
religious exercise by forcing them to do one
of three things: (a) comply with the Mandate
and provide contraceptive coverage, (b) take
advantage of the accommodation scheme, or
(c) pay steep fines for non-compliance. We
conclude that the accommodation scheme
relieves Plaintiffs of complying with the
Mandate or paying fines and does not impose
a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' religious
exercise for the purposes of RFRA.
To explain why the accommodation is
permissible under RFRA, we first review the
RFRA framework and consider how religious
accommodations may lessen or eliminate the
substantiality of a burden on religious
exercise. We then apply this framework to the
accommodation scheme before us, which
exempts religious non-profits from providing

contraceptive coverage and instead assigns
that task to health insurance issuers and
TPAs.
We conclude the accommodation does not
substantially burden Plaintiffs' religious
exercise. The accommodation relieves
Plaintiffs from complying with the Mandate
and guarantees they will not have to provide,
pay for, or facilitate contraceptive coverage.
Plaintiffs do not "trigger" or otherwise cause
contraceptive coverage because federal law,
not the act of opting out, entitles plan
participants and beneficiaries to coverage.
Although Plaintiffs allege the administrative
tasks required to opt out of the Mandate make
them complicit in the overall delivery
scheme, opting out instead relieves them
from complicity. Furthermore, these de
minimis administrative tasks do not
substantially burden religious exercise for the
purposes of RFRA.
The dissent parts ways with our majority
opinion on the self-insured plaintiffs' RFRA
claims. It stresses that, by opting out, the selfinsured plaintiffs would cause the legal
responsibility to provide contraceptive
coverage to shift to their TPAs. We agree. As
we observe below, the regulations are clear
on that point. But shifting legal responsibility
to provide coverage away from the plaintiffs
relieves rather than burdens their religious
exercise. The ACA and its implementing
regulations entitle plan participants and
beneficiaries to coverage whether or not the
plaintiffs opt out. And the government has
established a scheme where, if the law is
followed, self-insured plaintiffs that opt out
are relieved of providing, paying for, and
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facilitating coverage; the government assigns
that responsibility to their TPAs; and plan
participants and beneficiaries receive the
coverage to which they are entitled by federal
law. Such an arrangement is among the
common and permissible methods of
religious accommodation in a pluralist
society, and does not constitute a substantial
burden under RFRA.
A. Legal Background
1. Standard of Review
Each appeal before us seeks review of a
district court order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction. We review orders
granting or denying a preliminary injunction
for abuse of discretion.
.
A preliminary injunction may be granted if
the party seeking it shows: "(1) a likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) a likely threat
of [53] irreparable harm to the movant; (3)
the harm alleged by the movant outweighs
any harm to the non-moving party; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest." A district
court abuses its discretion by granting or
denying a preliminary injunction based on an
error
of
law.
2. RFRA and Free Exercise
RFRA was enacted in 1993 in response to
Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in which the
Supreme Court held that burdens on religious
exercise are constitutional under the Free
Exercise Clause if they result from a neutral
law of general application and have a rational

basis. Congress enacted RFRA to restore the
pre-Smith standard, which permitted legal
burdens on an individual's religious exercise
only if the government could show a
compelling need to apply the law to that
person and that the law did so in the least
restrictive way. Congress specified the
purpose of RFRA was to restore this
compelling interest test as it had been
recognized in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder.
By restoring the pre-Smith compelling
interest standard, Congress did not express
any intent to alter other aspects of Free
Exercise jurisprudence. Notably, pre-Smith
jurisprudence allowed the government "wide
latitude" to administer large administrative
programs, and rejected the imposition of
strict scrutiny in that context. As the Supreme
Court indicated in Bowen v. Roy,
In the enforcement of a facially
neutral and uniformly applicable
requirement for the administration of
welfare programs reaching many
millions of people, the Government is
entitled to wide latitude. The
Government should not be put to the
strict test applied by the District
Court; that standard required the
Government to justify enforcement of
the use of Social Security number
requirement as the least restrictive
means of accomplishing a compelling
state interest.
As we discuss at greater length below, the
pre-Smith standards restored by RFRA
permitted the Government to impose de
minimis administrative burdens on religious
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actors without running afoul of religious
liberty guarantees.
3. Elements of RFRA Analysis
RFRA analysis follows a burden-shifting
framework. "[A] plaintiff establishes a prima
facie claim under RFRA by proving the
following three elements: (1) a substantial
burden imposed by the federal government
on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of religion." The
burden then shifts to the government to
demonstrate its law or policy advances "a
compelling interest implemented through the
least restrictive means available.” The
government must show that the "compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of
the challenged law 'to the person'—the
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
religion is being substantially burdened."
"This burden-shifting approach applies even
at the preliminary injunction stage."
We have previously stated "a government act
imposes a 'substantial burden' on religious
exercise if it: (1) requires participation in an
activity prohibited by a sincerely held
religious belief, (2) prevents participation in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief, or (3) places substantial
pressure on an adherent to engage in conduct
contrary to a sincerely held religious belief."
As we discuss in the next section, whether a
law substantially burdens religious exercise
in one or more of these ways is a matter for
courts—not plaintiffs—to decide.
4. Courts Determine Substantial Burden

To determine whether plaintiffs have made a
prima facie RFRA claim, courts do not
question "whether the petitioner . . . correctly
perceived the commands of [his or her]
faith." But courts do determine whether a
challenged law or policy substantially
burdens plaintiffs' religious exercise. RFRA's
statutory text and religious liberty case law
demonstrate that courts—not plaintiffs—
must determine if a law or policy
substantially burdens religious exercise.
RFRA states the federal government "shall
not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion." We must "give effect . . . to every
clause and word" of a statute when possible.
Drafts of RFRA prohibited the government
from placing a "burden" on religious
exercise. Congress added the word
"substantially" before passage to clarify that
only some burdens would violate the act.
We therefore consider not only whether a law
or policy burdens religious exercise, but
whether that burden is substantial. If
plaintiffs could assert and establish that a
burden is "substantial" without any
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word
"substantial" would become wholly devoid of
independent
meaning.
Furthermore,
accepting any burden alleged by Plaintiffs as
"substantial" would improperly conflate the
determination that a religious belief is
sincerely held with the determination that a
law or policy substantially burdens religious
exercise.
Every circuit that has addressed a RFRA
challenge to the accommodation scheme at
issue here has concluded that whether the
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government has imposed a "substantial
burden" is a legal determination. This
is consistent with our determination that we
review de novo "what constitutes [a]
substantial burden . . . and the ultimate
determination as to whether the RFRA has
been violated." Thus, we "accept[] as true the
factual allegations that [Plaintiffs'] beliefs are
sincere and of a religious nature—but not the
legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegation,
that [their] religious exercise is substantially
burdened."
We have cautioned that substantiality does
not permit us to scrutinize the "theological
merit" of a plaintiff's religious beliefs—
instead, we analyze "the intensity of the
coercion applied by the government to act
contrary to those beliefs." Our only task is to
determine whether the claimant's belief is
sincere, and if so, whether the government
has applied substantial pressure on the
claimant to violate that belief." In
determining whether a law or policy applies
substantial pressure on a claimant to violate
his or her beliefs, we consider how the law or
policy being challenged actually operates and
affects religious exercise. When evaluating
RFRA claims, we have therefore recognized
that not all burdens alleged by plaintiffs
amount to substantial burdens. Furthermore,
as we discuss in the following section, the
existence of an accommodation may affect
whether a law or policy burdens
religious exercise and whether that burden is
substantial.
5. Accommodations Can Lessen or Eliminate
Burden

We finally note that accommodations
function to lessen or eliminate the burden of
a generally applicable law. In Hobby Lobby,
this court said the stark choice between
providing contraceptive coverage and paying
steep fines constitutes a sufficiently
substantial burden to warrant relief under
RFRA. Religious objectors are not always
put to such a stark choice. When, as here,
plaintiffs are offered an accommodation to a
law or policy that would otherwise constitute
a substantial burden, we must analyze
whether the accommodation renders the
potential burden on religious exercise
insubstantial or nonexistent such that the law
or policy that includes the accommodation
satisfies RFRA.
Accommodations may eliminate burdens on
religious exercise or reduce those burdens to
de minimis acts of administrative compliance
that are not substantial for RFRA purposes.
The Supreme Court recognized this point in
Hobby Lobby when it suggested an
accommodation to exempt the plaintiff
corporations from complying with the
Mandate could satisfy RFRA concerns.
The D.C. Circuit observed that "[a] burden
does not rise to the level of being substantial
when it places an inconsequential or de
minimis burden on an adherent's religious
exercise." Were it otherwise, our substantial
burden inquiry would become a blunt tool
incapable of recognizing the meaningful
difference between forcing organizations to
provide or pay for contraceptives and
allowing them to opt out of that requirement.
To determine whether the accommodation
scheme in these cases renders the alleged
burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise
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nonexistent or insubstantial, we turn to the
merits of Plaintiffs' RFRA arguments.
B.

Substantial

Burden

accommodation does not substantially
burden Plaintiffs' religious exercise as a
matter
of
law.

Analysis

1. Plaintiffs' RFRA Arguments
The cases before us turn on whether
complying with the accommodation
constitutes a substantial burden. The
Government does not dispute the sincerity of
Plaintiffs' religious belief that they may not
provide,
pay
for,
or
facilitate
contraceptive coverage. The parties dispute
whether the accommodation scheme
substantially burdens the Plaintiffs' exercise
of religion.
Plaintiffs oppose completing the Form or
notifying HHS because they believe they are
being asked to play a causal role in the
delivery of contraceptive coverage and would
be complicit or perceived to be complicit in
the overall contraceptive delivery scheme by
virtue of their opting out. They also allege
their continuing involvement in the
regulatory scheme is a substantial burden.
The Government responds that completing
the Form or notification does not involve
Plaintiffs in the delivery of contraceptive
coverage. The accommodation relieves
Plaintiffs of their obligations under the
Mandate, and when that occurs, federal law
authorizes and obligates a health insurance
issuer or TPA to provide or arrange for the
delivery of contraceptive coverage to plan
participants and beneficiaries who are
entitled to that coverage under the ACA. The
Government
therefore
argues
the

2. The Accommodation Scheme Eliminates
Burdens on Religious Exercise
Under the accommodation scheme, the act of
opting out relieves objecting religious nonprofit organizations from complying with the
Mandate and excuses them from participating
in the provision of contraceptive coverage.
The
Departments
designed
the
accommodation so that, upon receipt of the
Form or a notification from the government,
health insurance issuers and TPAs—not the
objecting religious non-profit organization—
provide contraceptive coverage and ensure
the organization will not be required to
provide, pay for, or otherwise facilitate that
coverage. We review this feature of the
accommodation scheme to show how it
eliminates burdens Plaintiffs otherwise
would face, similar to the burdens the forprofit plaintiffs faced in Hobby Lobby.
First, the regulations specify a health
insurance issuer must handle contraceptive
coverage separately from the insurance
provided under the religious non-profit
organization's plan.
A group health insurance issuer that receives
a copy of the self-certification or notification
. . . must (A) Expressly exclude contraceptive
coverage from the group health insurance
coverage provided in connection with the
group health plan; and (B) Provide separate
payments for any contraceptive services
required to be covered under §
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147.130(a)(1)(iv) for plan participants and
beneficiaries for so long as they remain
enrolled in the plan.
Second, after a religious non-profit
organization opts out, a health insurance
issuer may not share the costs of providing
contraception with the employer or
employees.
With respect to payments for contraceptive
services, the [health insurance] issuer may
not impose any cost-sharing requirements
(such as a copayment, coinsurance, or a
deductible), or impose any premium, fee, or
other charge, or any portion thereof, directly
or indirectly, on the eligible organization, the
group health plan, or plan participants or
beneficiaries. The issuer must segregate
premium revenue collected from the eligible
organization from the monies used to provide
payments for contraceptive services.
TPAs are subject to similar requirements.
Finally, a health insurance issuer or TPA
must, in communicating with plan
participants or beneficiaries, send separate
notice regarding contraceptive coverage from
other plan notifications and make clear the
employer neither administers nor funds
contraceptive benefits. A health insurance
issuer or TPA:
must provide to plan participants and
beneficiaries written notice of the
availability of separate payments for
contraceptive
services
contemporaneous with (to the extent
possible), but separate from, any
application materials distributed in
connection with enrollment (or reenrollment) in group health coverage
that is effective beginning on the first

day of each applicable plan year. The
notice must specify that the eligible
organization
does
not [68]
administer
or
fund
contraceptive benefits, but that the
third party administrator or issuer, as
applicable,
provides
separate
payments for contraceptive services,
and must provide contact information
for questions and complaints.
All of the foregoing removes the objecting
religious non-profit organizations from
providing contraceptive coverage, but
Plaintiffs argue these protections of their
religious liberty are insufficient because they
still must deliver a Form or notify HHS to opt
out of the Mandate. They contend this act
substantially burdens their religious exercise
because it "triggers" the provision of
contraceptive coverage, makes them
complicit in the larger delivery scheme, and
demands their ongoing involvement. We
disagree. The accommodation relieves
Plaintiffs of their statutory obligation to
provide contraceptive coverage to their plan
participants and beneficiaries, and as we
discuss below, taking advantage of that
accommodation is not a substantial burden on
religious exercise.
3. The Accommodation Scheme Does Not
Impose a Substantial Burden
To explain why the accommodation scheme
does not substantially burden Plaintiffs'
religious exercise, we look at the theories
argued by the Plaintiffs and why they fail.
a. Opting out does not cause contraceptive
coverage.
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Although the accommodation scheme frees
Plaintiffs from providing, paying for, or
facilitating contraceptive coverage, they
contend that, by delivering the Form or
notifying HHS, they nevertheless "trigger" or
cause contraceptive coverage. They do not.
As we explain below, Plaintiffs' causation
argument misconstrues the statutory and
regulatory framework. Federal law, not the
Form or notification to HHS, provides for
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing
to plan participants and beneficiaries.
Because
the
mechanics
of
the
accommodation scheme differ slightly for
different types of plans, we examine how the
regulations work for insured plans, selfinsured plans, and self-insured church plans.
But in each circumstance, Plaintiffs'
causation argument fails to establish any
burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise.
i. Insured Plans
The plaintiffs with insured plans deal directly
with a health insurance issuer and do not use
a TPA. They argue the accommodation
scheme levies a substantial burden on their
religious exercise because "insurance issuers
will sell [them] plans that either (a)
expressly include abortifacients; or (b)
functionally include abortifacients by
guaranteeing separate payments for them
upon [their] execution and conveyance of the
self-certification to the issuer." We disagree.
The regulations do not burden the religious
exercise of employers using insured plans.
The ACA obligates both group health plans
and health insurance issuers to provide
contraceptive coverage. A religious non-

profit organization may comply with the
Mandate and provide coverage to its
employees,
opt
out
using
the
accommodation, or not comply with the law
and pay fines. But in each instance, the health
insurance
issuer
must
ensure
the
organization's
employees
receive
contraceptive coverage.
By delivering the Form or notifying HHS, an
organization with an insured plan does not
enable coverage—to the contrary, it simply
notifies its health insurance issuer the
organization will not be providing coverage.
The health insurance issuer then has an
independent and exclusive obligation
to provide that coverage without cost sharing.
The relevant regulation states: "When a selfcertification is provided directly to an issuer,
the issuer has sole responsibility for
providing such coverage in accordance with
§ 147.130." Because the ACA obligates
health insurance issuers to provide
contraceptive coverage, they must meet this
obligation independently and irrespective of
the notification. The self-certification does
not impose any responsibility; it merely
makes it the issuer's sole responsibility rather
than one shared with the group health plan
itself.
Because federal law requires the health
insurance issuer to provide coverage and the
accommodation process removes an
objecting organization from participating,
plaintiffs with insured plans fail to show the
accommodation burdens their religious
exercise. The insured plaintiffs are not
burdened when they are relieved of their
responsibility and their insurers provide
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coverage as required by independent
obligations set out in the ACA.
ii. Self-Insured Plans
The accommodation scheme permits
religious non-profit organizations with selfinsured plans to opt out by delivering the
Form to their TPA or notifying HHS that they
have a religious objection and will not
comply with the Mandate. When the
objecting organization opts out, the TPA that
administers its group health plan is
responsible for providing contraceptive
coverage if it wishes to remain a TPA for the
plan. In this section, we address this selfinsured arrangement. In the next section, we
consider the subset of self-insured plaintiffs
having church plans over which the
government lacks enforcement authority
under ERISA to compel the TPA to comply
with its legal obligations.
1) Plaintiffs' argument
The only plaintiff with a self-insured plan
subject to ERISA is Southern Nazarene.
Southern
Nazarene
argues
the
accommodation
scheme
substantially
burdens its religious exercise because the
scheme requires it to "comply with the
Mandate by either (a) setting up a selfinsured plan that includes abortifacients; or
(b) setting up a self-insured plan that
functionally includes abortifacients by
guaranteeing separate payments for them by
the TPA upon the entity's execution of the
self-certification.” Self-insured plaintiffs
with ERISA-exempt church plans make
similar claims.

Plaintiffs and the dissent emphasize that the
TPA may arrange or provide coverage
only after a religious non-profit organization
opts out. We consider this to be an
uncontested and unremarkable feature of the
accommodation scheme. The regulations
state that when a religious non-profit
organization opts out of providing
contraceptive coverage, the TPA is notified
that the organization will not administer or
pay for contraceptive coverage, and that it
must provide or arrange for contraceptive
coverage without cost sharing if it wishes to
continue administering the plan. The TPA is
authorized and obligated to provide the
coverage guaranteed by the ACA only if the
religious non-profit organization that has
primary responsibility for contraceptive
coverage opts out of providing it.
Plaintiffs suggest this shift in legal
responsibility for contraceptive coverage
substantially burdens their religious exercise
under RFRA. They argue their opting out
would trigger, cause, or offer a "permission
slip" for the delivery of contraception by
allowing their TPA to provide the coverage.
We disagree.
2) Opting out does not cause coverage
The ACA requires all group health plans to
cover preventive services, including
contraception, without cost sharing. Because
a group health plan must include
contraceptive coverage under the ACA, the
accommodation scheme requires a TPA that
administers a self-insured religious nonprofit organization's group health plan to
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provide coverage if the organization opts out.
The TPA must then arrange coverage for plan
participants and beneficiaries if it wishes to
continue functioning as the TPA for the
objecting organization. This arrangement
allows religious non-profit organizations to
opt out and ensures plan participants and
beneficiaries will receive the contraceptive
coverage to which they are entitled by law.
Under this framework, the plaintiffs'
argument does not identify a substantial
burden on religious exercise. The opt out
does not "cause" contraceptive coverage; it
relieves objectors of their coverage
responsibility, at which point federal law
shifts that responsibility to a different actor.
The ACA and its implementing regulations
have already required that group health plans
will include contraceptive coverage and have
assigned legal responsibilities to ensure such
coverage will be provided when the religious
non-profit organization opts out.
This arrangement is typical of religious
objection accommodations that shift
responsibility to non-objecting entities only
after an objector declines to perform a task on
religious grounds. Although a religious nonprofit organization may opt out from
providing contraceptive coverage, it cannot
preclude the government from requiring
others to provide the legally required
coverage in its stead. In short, the framework
established by federal law, not the actions of
the religious objector, ensures that plan
participants and beneficiaries will receive
contraceptive
coverage.
3) Response to dissent

The dissent argues that our reasoning fails to
appreciate the difference between insured
and self-insured plans. With insured plans,
the health insurance issuer bears legal
responsibility to provide contraceptive
coverage whether or not the religious nonprofit has opted out. With self-insured
plans, the TPA shoulders legal responsibility
for coverage only after the religious nonprofit has opted out.
We agree this is a distinction between these
types of plans, but the dissent overplays its
importance. In both contexts, the ACA
requires that group health plans cover
contraceptive services, and a plaintiff knows
coverage will be provided when it opts out.
Plaintiffs do not dispute plan participants and
beneficiaries' right to contraceptive coverage,
nor do they contest the government's ability
to require TPAs and health insurance issuers
to arrange for such coverage when a religious
non-profit organization opts out. The only
question before us is whether the plaintiffs
are substantially burdened when they notify
the government of their objection with the
knowledge that another party will be required
to provide coverage in their stead. The
answer is no.
A religious accommodation tries to reconcile
religious liberty with the rule of law. When
faced with an unavoidable conflict between
following the law or religious belief, RFRA
provides a religious objector a means to
challenge a generally applicable law and seek
an exception to avoid following that law
without having to break it. A statutory
accommodation, as we have here, serves the
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same purpose. As noted above, this case is
unusual because the Plaintiffs do not seek an
accommodation where none exists, but
instead challenge a statutory accommodation
and argue that the process for seeking refuge
in it substantially burdens their religious
exercise. As to the self-insured plaintiffs, the
dissent contends that if they opt out and
transfer their duty to provide contraceptive
coverage to the TPA, they necessarily cause
such coverage. We disagree.
By opting out, the self-insured plaintiffs shift
their duty to provide coverage to a TPA, but
they do not change their plan participants and
beneficiaries' entitlement to contraceptive
coverage under federal law. The dissent
suggests, however, that because the plaintiffs
can stymie coverage to their employees by
breaking the law and incurring fines, and
because opting out ultimately results in the
TPAs' providing coverage, the plaintiffs'
opting out therefore would cause
contraceptive
coverage.
But
this
misconstrues the purpose of religious
accommodation: to permit the religious
objector both to avoid a religious burden and
to comply with the law. If the plaintiffs wish
to avail themselves of a legal means—an
accommodation—to be excused from
compliance with a law, they cannot rely on
the possibility of their violating that very
same law to challenge the accommodation. In
making this argument, the dissent focuses
almost exclusively on whether the plaintiffs'
opt out is a but-for cause of the TPAs'
authority to provide contraceptive coverage.
It does, but this approach misses the mark.
Although opting out is necessarily a but-for
cause of someone else—the TPA—providing

contraceptive coverage, that is the point of an
accommodation—shifting a responsibility
from an objector to a non-objector. That is
how a legislative policy choice—here, to
afford women contraceptive coverage—can
be reconciled with religious objections to that
policy. We do not "den[y] the existence of
any causation." We instead correctly identify
the effect of opting out. The effect is to shift
legal responsibility from the self-insured
plaintiff to its TPA and relieve the plaintiff of
the duty it considers objectionable. The effect
is not the provision of contraceptive
coverage, which would be afforded under the
law whether or not the plaintiff opts out.
The ACA requires that either the religious
non-profit organization or the TPA must
provide contraceptive coverage for a selfinsured group health plan, and the
accommodation must be evaluated with that
provision in mind. The scheme allows the
religious non-profit organization to opt out of
the responsibility of providing coverage and
assigns that duty to the TPA administering
the group health plan. Crucially, it does not
change or expand contraceptive coverage
beyond what federal law has already
guaranteed. As the Supreme Court said in
Hobby Lobby, the effect of the
accommodation on employees "would be
precisely zero. Under that accommodation,
these women would still be entitled to all
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost
sharing."
The government has designed the
accommodation so plaintiffs that opt out are
freed from providing, paying for, or
facilitating contraception, and the TPA's
responsibility to provide coverage in their
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stead stems from federal law. Because this
arrangement does not substantially burden
the plaintiffs when they comply with the law,
it does not matter whether the plaintiffs could
prevent plan participants and beneficiaries
from receiving coverage by violating the law.
The dissent seems to suggest the ACA and its
implementing regulations give self-insured
plaintiffs discretion to decide whether their
employees receive contraceptive coverage.
The ACA and its implementing regulations
do not, and the plaintiffs do not contend that
they do. To the contrary, federal law
generally requires that all people must have
health insurance and that all health insurance
must include preventive services, including
contraceptive coverage.
And "although [the ACA] does not
specifically
mention
third-party
administrators, they administer 'group health
plans,' which must include coverage. Nothing
suggests the insurers' or third-party
administrators' obligations would be waived
if the plaintiffs refused to apply for the
accommodation."
The
accommodation
scheme does not give plaintiffs discretion to
thwart their employees' right to contraceptive
coverage by refusing to provide coverage and
also refusing to register their objection so the
government
can
make
alternative
arrangements to free them from providing
coverage. Because Congress has created a
federal entitlement to contraceptive coverage
and formulated a framework to guarantee that
coverage will be provided even if plaintiffs
decline to provide it, self-insured plaintiffs do
not "cause" contraceptive coverage by
exercising their ability to opt out.

4) No cause of substantial burden
In sum, the self-insured plaintiffs' causal
analysis falters regarding the effect of opting
out, which is to shift legal responsibility to
provide contraceptive coverage from
plaintiffs to their TPAs. When the
government establishes a scheme that
anticipates religious concerns by allowing
objectors to opt out but ensuring that others
will take up their responsibilities, plaintiffs
are not substantially burdened merely
because their decision to opt out cannot
prevent the responsibility from being met.
To establish a claim under RFRA, about
which the dissent says little, a plaintiff must
show the government substantially burdens
its sincere religious exercise. The ACA states
group health plans must cover contraception,
and the regulations state that if a religious
non-profit organization opts out, that
coverage will be provided by a TPA. Opting
out does not cause the coverage itself; federal
law does, by establishing a scheme that
permits plaintiffs to opt out of their legal
responsibility while simultaneously ensuring
that plan participants and beneficiaries
receive the coverage to which they are legally
entitled. Allowing plaintiffs to opt out is not
a substantial burden under RFRA.
iii. Self-Insured Church Plans
The foregoing analysis of self-insured plans
applies to the subset of self-insured church
plans. We address additional reasons here to
reject the church plan plaintiffs' RFRA
claims.
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The plaintiffs with self-insured church plans
are in a unique position. A TPA cannot be
compelled to provide or arrange for
contraceptive coverage if it administers a
church plan under 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) that has
not elected to comply with provisions of
ERISA under 26 U.S.C. § 410(d)—which
describes the self-insured church plans in the
cases before us. The Departments concede
they lack authority under ERISA to force
these church plan TPAs to perform their
regulatory responsibility. As a result, the
Government can require the plaintiffs with
self-insured church plans to use the Form or
notify HHS to register their objection and opt
out, but it has no enforcement authority to
compel or penalize those plaintiffs' TPAs if
they decline to provide or arrange for
contraceptive coverage.
The lack of enforcement authority makes any
burden on plaintiffs with church plans even
less substantial than the burden on plaintiffs
with self-insured plans that are subject to
ERISA. Nonetheless, plaintiffs with church
plans offer the following arguments as to why
the accommodation scheme might still
burden their religious exercise. First, the
Departments could decide to alter the
regulations and assert authority over church
plans under ERISA. Second, the mere act of
signing the Form or delivering the
notification may involve them in the
provision of contraception, either by
cooperating with the Departments or by
providing authorization to a TPA, which then
decides it wants to provide contraceptive
coverage after all. Third, their opting out
incentivizes TPAs to provide coverage even

if they are exempt from ERISA. Fourth, the
Government has not demonstrated why the
plaintiffs must complete the self-certification
if their TPAs can decline to provide
contraceptive coverage. In addition to the
reasons self-insured plans in general are not
substantially
burdened
by
the
accommodation scheme, we conclude the
plaintiffs with self-insured church plans have
failed to identify a substantial burden on
religious exercise.
1) Hypothetical regulation
The plaintiffs argue the Departments could
assert authority over church plans under
ERISA at some point in the future. We assess
the regulations as they currently exist, not
amendments to ERISA's implementing
regulations the Department of Labor may
hypothetically promulgate. An "[i]njunction
issues to prevent existing or presently
threatened injuries. One will not be granted
against something merely feared as liable to
occur at some indefinite time in the future."
Should the Departments assert ERISA
authority over church plans at some later
date, plaintiffs may then seek a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Departments from
enforcing the Mandate. Unless and until the
Departments change their position, however,
plaintiffs' speculative argument does not
warrant
a
preliminary
injunction.
2) No causation from church plan TPA
notification
The plaintiffs contend completing the selfcertification would be a substantial burden
because it would allow TPAs to provide
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coverage to their group health plan
participants and beneficiaries, even if the
Departments cannot compel the TPA to do so
under ERISA. But plaintiffs with self-insured
church plans are not substantially burdened
by the requirement that they complete the
Form or notification to HHS. As we
explained in the previous section on selfinsured plans, when a religious non-profit
organization opts out of the Mandate, the
requirement that the group health plan
include contraceptive coverage is a product
of federal law, not the product of the
organization's opting out. Opting out frees
plaintiffs from their obligation to provide
contraceptive coverage under the ACA. The
lack of substantial burden is especially
evident when the group health plan is
administered by a TPA that has made clear it
will not provide contraceptive coverage on
religious grounds. The Little Sisters' TPA, for
example, is Christian Brothers, their coplaintiff in this case. It is clear Christian
Brothers need not, and will not, provide
contraceptive coverage if the Little Sisters
opt out of the Mandate.
3) No incentive from church plan TPA
notification
Even when TPAs for self-insured church
plans indicate they may comply with the
Mandate, the TPAs make that decision, and
the
objecting
religious
non-profit
organization is not substantially burdened.
The plaintiffs in Reaching Souls argue one of
their TPAs, Highmark, has indicated it will
provide contraceptive coverage if they opt
out of the Mandate. The Reaching Souls
plaintiffs argue their act of opting out would

not only provide Highmark with permission
to provide contraceptive coverage, but would
incentivize it to do so because Highmark
could then seek reimbursement from the
government.
Plaintiffs
fail
to
demonstrate
the
reimbursement provision actually gives
TPAs an incentive to provide coverage. They
claim a TPA that receives the Form or a letter
from the government "becomes eligible for
government payments that will both cover
the TPA's costs and include an additional
payment (equal to at least 10% of costs) for
the TPA's margin and overhead."
At a hearing in Reaching Souls, counsel for
the Government seemed to accept this
characterization. But the regulations
themselves expressly contradict this reading.
They state the payment for margin and
overhead goes to health insurance issuers
who act as intermediaries for the
reimbursement, and need not go to TPAs
Moreover, even if TPAs were to receive a
payment for margin and overhead—set at
15% of costs for 2014—plaintiffs do not
demonstrate this allowance actually
functions as an incentive to provide
contraceptive
coverage
rather
than
repayment for the administrative costs TPAs
incur by stepping in to arrange for or provide
coverage. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
the allowance for administrative overhead
actually generates a profit for TPAs, nor have
they demonstrated that the allowance would
incentivize TPAs to provide coverage where
they otherwise would not.
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4) The Government may require affirmative
objection
Plaintiffs finally argue that if the
Departments lack ERISA enforcement
authority against TPAs of self-insured church
plans, the Government has no reason to
require religious non-profit organizations to
comply with the accommodation scheme and
deliver the Form or notify HHS. It is the
plaintiffs' burden, however, to state a prima
facie case under RFRA. Because they cannot
establish that signing the Form or notifying
HHS constitutes a substantial burden on their
religious exercise, we do not question the
Departments' interest in requiring them to opt
out of the Mandate to avoid penalties for
failure to provide contraceptive coverage.
****
We conclude the Plaintiffs' causation
arguments do not establish a burden on their
religious exercise, much less a substantial
burden, because opting out would not trigger,
incentivize, or otherwise cause the provision
of contraceptive coverage. We therefore turn
to Plaintiffs' argument that the act of opting
out and the administrative requirements
associated with the accommodation make
them feel or appear complicit in the overall
contraceptive coverage scheme.
e. No substantial burden from complicity
The accommodation relieves Plaintiffs from
providing, paying for, or facilitating
contraceptive coverage and federal law
requires health insurance issuers and TPAs to

provide contraceptive coverage when
religious non-profit organizations take
advantage of the accommodation. Plaintiffs
argue the act of opting out would
nevertheless substantially burden their
religious exercise because they believe
delivering the Form or notification to HHS
would make them complicit in the overall
scheme to deliver contraceptive coverage.
They wish to play no part in it. We find this
argument unconvincing for a number of
reasons.
First, the purpose and design of the
accommodation scheme is to ensure that
Plaintiffs are not complicit—that they do not
have to provide, pay for, or facilitate
contraception. Plaintiffs' concern that others
may believe they condone the Mandate is
unfounded. Opting out sends the
unambiguous message that they oppose
contraceptive coverage and refuse to provide
it, and does not foreclose them from
objecting both to contraception and the
Mandate in the strongest possible terms.
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs assert that
completing the Form or notification violates
their religious beliefs, they state a necessary
but not a sufficient predicate for a RFRA
claim. Under RFRA, they must establish that
completing the Form or notification
substantially burdens their religious exercise;
otherwise, this argument could be used to
avoid almost any legal obligation that
involves a form. Plaintiffs do not object to
signing forms and paperwork generally—
they object to the Form or notification to
HHS, and they do so because they believe it
involves them in directly or indirectly
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providing, paying for, or facilitating
contraceptive coverage, which they oppose
as a matter of religious conviction. As we
have explained, the Plaintiffs misstate their
role in the accommodation scheme. RFRA
does not require us to defer to their erroneous
view about the operation of the ACA and its
implementing regulations.
Third, because the accommodation does not
involve them in providing, paying for,
facilitating, or causing contraceptive
coverage, Plaintiffs' only involvement in the
scheme is the act of opting out. Plaintiffs are
not substantially burdened solely by the de
minimis administrative tasks this involves.
All opt-out schemes require some affirmative
act to free objectors from the obligations they
would otherwise face. The Plaintiffs' logic
would undermine conscientious objection
schemes that require the objection to be
made, relieve objectors of their obligations,
but assign those obligations to other, nonobjecting actors in their stead.
Having to file paperwork or otherwise
register a religious objection, even if one
disagrees with the ultimate aim of the law at
issue, does not alone substantially burden
religious exercise.
The Government may therefore require
religious objectors to complete de minimis
administrative tasks to opt out. Filing the
Form or notifying HHS easily fits within this
category. The Departments have made opting
out of the Mandate at least as easy as
obtaining a parade permit, filing a simple tax
form, or registering to vote—in other words,
a routine, brief administrative task. The

purpose of the Form or notification to HHS is
to extricate Plaintiffs from their legal
obligation to provide contraceptive coverage.
Opting out ensures they will play no part in
the provision of contraceptive coverage,
prohibits TPAs and health insurance issuers
from sharing the costs of providing coverage
with them, and requires notice to employees
that they do not administer or fund
contraceptive services.
The notification to HHS is especially
minimal, as it requires Plaintiffs only to
register their objection with HHS and does
not require any contact with their health
insurance issuers or TPAs. Although
Plaintiffs must tell HHS which health
insurance issuer or TPA they use to opt out of
the Mandate, this is not a substantial burden
on religious exercise.
It is the kind of administrative task the
Departments can require of religious
believers in the administration of
governmental programs. When understood in
light of the ACA's requirement that group
health plans and health insurance issuers
provide contraceptive coverage and the
manner in which the accommodation relieves
Plaintiffs of providing that coverage,
identifying one's TPA in a letter to HHS is at
most a minimal burden and certainly not a
substantial one.
Finally, Plaintiffs are not substantially
burdened when, after they opt out and are
relieved of their obligations under the
Mandate, health insurance issuers or TPAs
must provide contraception to plan
participants and beneficiaries. Plaintiffs
sincerely oppose contraception, but their
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religious objection cannot hamstring
government efforts to ensure that plan
participants and beneficiaries receive the
coverage to which they are entitled under the
ACA. "Religious objectors do not suffer
substantial burdens under RFRA where the
only harm to them is that they sincerely feel
aggrieved by their inability to prevent what
other people would do to fulfill regulatory
objectives after they opt out." Pre-Smith case
law and RFRA's legislative history
underscore that religious exercise is not
substantially burdened merely because the
Government spends its money or arranges its
own affairs in ways that plaintiffs find
objectionable. RFRA does not prevent the
Government from reassigning obligations
after an objector opts out simply because the
objector strongly opposes the ultimate goal of
the generally applicable law.
Plaintiffs' complicity argument therefore
fails. Opting out would eliminate their
complicity with the Mandate and require only
routine
and
minimal
administrative
paperwork, and they are not substantially
burdened by the Government's subsequent
efforts to deliver contraceptive coverage in
their stead.
f. No burden from ongoing requirements
As a final argument, Plaintiffs deny the act of
opting out would free them from further
involvement in the provision of contraceptive
coverage. They argue the accommodation
scheme would require their ongoing
participation, and give two examples to
support this claim.

First, Plaintiffs argue they would remain
involved because the Departments are
commandeering their group health plans to
provide contraceptive coverage to their
employees. They note their TPA or health
insurance issuer can provide coverage only as
long as plan participants and beneficiaries
remain employed with the religious nonprofit organization.
Plaintiffs have not shown, assuming they opt
out, how the provision of coverage to plan
participants and beneficiaries through the
health insurance issuer or TPA would
substantially burden their religious exercise.
Plaintiffs' plan participants and beneficiaries
are not guaranteed contraceptive coverage
without cost sharing because they work for
the Plaintiffs; they are guaranteed
contraceptive coverage under the ACA. The
ACA mandates health insurance that includes
contraceptive coverage. Plaintiffs' theory
would not only relieve them of complying
with the Mandate, it would prevent health
insurance issuers and TPAs from stepping in
under the ACA to provide plan participants
and beneficiaries with the coverage they are
entitled to receive under federal law.
Second, Plaintiffs object that they must (a)
notify their TPA or health insurance issuer
when employees join or leave their broader
health insurance scheme, and (b) complete
the self-certification or notification to HHS
when they create or terminate a relationship
with a TPA or health insurance issuer. As to
the first requirement, employers already must
notify their TPA or health insurance issuer
when they hire or fire employees. The
communication with the TPA or health
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insurance issuer regarding general health
insurance coverage for entering or exiting
plan participants and beneficiaries would
occur regardless of any legal obligation under
the accommodation scheme. The latter
requirement, however, is an obligation
specific to the accommodation scheme. An
insured or self-insured employer using the
Form must send it to "each" TPA or health
insurance issuer as the employer forms
contractual relationships with them. If the
employer instead uses the notification
process, the regulations state: "If there is a
change in any of the information required to
be included in the notice, the organization
must provide updated information to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services."
Once again, this does not constitute a
substantial burden. The only new
requirement is that employers must complete
the Form or notify HHS of their objection
when they contract with a new health
insurance issuer or TPA. Plaintiffs do not
argue the time, cost, or energy required to
comply with this requirement constitutes a
substantial burden; they argue it is the moral
significance of their involvement which
burdens their religious exercise.
If the first self-certification is not a
substantial burden, a second or third selfcertification would not be substantially
burdensome given the extremely minimal
administrative requirements of the Form or
notification. As we have discussed above, de
minimis administrative requirements do not
themselves amount to substantial burdens on
religious liberty. If the actual delivery of the
Form or notification is not a substantial
burden,
a
contingent
administrative

requirement to update the Form or
notification is not either.
The regulations require the Plaintiffs to
complete the Form or deliver the notification
if they wish to opt out. But this ministerial act
to opt out is not a substantial burden on
religious exercise, nor are the collateral
requirements of the scheme. The
Departments have allowed Plaintiffs to opt
out of a neutral and generally applicable
requirement imposed by federal law, and
have done so in a manner that affirmatively
distances those organizations from the
provision of contraceptive coverage that
other employers must provide. It is not a
substantial burden to require organizations to
provide
minimal
information
for
administrative purposes to take advantage of
that accommodation.
C. Strict Scrutiny
Because we determine Plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate a substantial burden on their
religious exercise, we need not address
whether the Departments have shown a
compelling state interest and adopted the
least restrictive means of advancing that
interest
D. Conclusion
In the absence of a substantial burden,
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits of their
RFRA claim, nor have they demonstrated
they will suffer irreparable injury if an
injunction is denied. Accordingly, a
preliminary injunction on RFRA grounds is
inappropriate.
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VI. FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the district courts focused almost
exclusively on RFRA, Plaintiffs also raised
constitutional claims. They argue the
accommodation scheme violates the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First
Amendment
by
exempting
religious employers from the Mandate but
requiring religious non-profit organizations
to seek an accommodation. Plaintiffs also
argue
the
accommodation
scheme
simultaneously compels and silences their
speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. We disagree and
conclude the accommodation scheme
comports with the First Amendment. We note
that the same standard of review we
identified for the RFRA claim applies to the
First Amendment claims.

are subject only to rational basis review,
which they survive.
1. Legal Background
The First Amendment's religion clauses state:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." To resolve challenges
under the Free Exercise Clause, we use a
well-established framework. If a law is
neutral and generally applicable, it does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause "even if the
law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice." "A law is
neutral so long as its object is something
other than the infringement or restriction of
religious practices." A law that is facially
neutral may nevertheless fail the neutrality
test if it covertly targets religious conduct for
adverse treatment.

A. Free Exercise Clause
Plaintiffs contend the ACA and its
implementing regulations violate the Free
Exercise Clause by exempting some religious
objectors—churches and their "integrated
auxiliaries"—from the Mandate, while
requiring others—specifically, religious nonprofit organizations—to comply with the
Mandate, seek an accommodation, or pay
substantial fines. They have not explained
how their Free Exercise claim differs from
their Establishment Clause claim, nor do they
explain how they could prevail under the
standard in Smith if they are unlikely to
succeed under RFRA. Because we conclude
the Mandate and accommodation scheme are
neutral and generally applicable laws, they

To determine whether a law is generally
applicable, we ask if the "legislature
decide[d] that the governmental interests it
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued
only against conduct with a religious
motivation." "[A] law that is both neutral and
generally applicable need only be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest
to survive a constitutional challenge."
2. The Mandate and
Scheme are Neutral

Accommodation

The Mandate and the accommodation
scheme are neutral laws. The Mandate is
facially neutral with regard to employers, and
neither the history nor the text of the ACA
and its implementing regulations suggest the
Mandate was targeted at a particular religion
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or religious practice. Plaintiffs cannot show
Congress or HHS "had as their object the
suppression of religion." To the contrary, the
Mandate arose from concerns about the
personal and social costs of barriers
preventing women from receiving preventive
care, including reproductive health care.
The accommodation scheme was developed
to facilitate the free exercise of religion, not
to target religious groups or burden religious
practice. To that end, the Departments
expanded the religious employer exemption
and religious non-profit organization
accommodation to respond to the concerns of
religious groups. The Plaintiffs' apparent
dissatisfaction with the accommodation
offered to them does not mean the Mandate
or the accommodation scheme is non-neutral.
3. The Mandate and Accommodation
Scheme are Generally Applicable
The Mandate and the accommodation
scheme are also generally applicable.
Plaintiffs cannot show Congress or the
Departments sought to impose the Mandate
only against religious groups; to the contrary,
the Mandate applies to all employers with
more than fifty employees using nongrandfathered health plans. "The exemptions
do not render the law so under-inclusive as to
belie the government's interest in protecting
public health and promoting women's wellbeing or to suggest that disfavoring Catholic
or other pro-life employers was its objective.
Plaintiffs
fail
to
demonstrate
the
accommodation scheme targets religious
conduct or was created with the objective of
disfavoring particular faiths. To the contrary,

the Mandate was enacted as part of a larger
program of health care reform, and both the
exemption for religious employers and the
accommodation for religious non-profit
organizations demonstrate federal deference
to religious liberty concerns and were
promulgated to facilitate rather than inhibit
the free exercise of religion.
4. The Mandate and Accommodation
Scheme Have a Rational Basis
Rather than make an argument based on the
rational relationship standard, Plaintiffs
instead contend our decision in Hobby Lobby
precludes us from finding that public health
and gender equality, without greater
specificity,
constitute
compelling
governmental interests. But, as we have
explained, the compelling interest test does
not apply; the rational basis test does. The
Government observes that in the cases before
us, the accommodation scheme rationally
serves the twin interests of facilitating
religious exercise and filling coverage gaps
resulting from accommodating that religious
exercise.
On rational basis review, these interests are
sufficient.
Alleviating
governmental
interference with religious exercise, which
the accommodation scheme does, is a
permissible legislative purpose. And we need
not scrutinize whether the Government's
interest in public health and gender equality
is more compelling in this case than in Hobby
Lobby. We need only determine that public
health and gender equality are legitimate
state interests. We believe they meet this
more permissive standard, which is not
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foreclosed by our compelling interest
analysis
in
Hobby
Lobby.
The
accommodation scheme advances both the
free exercise of religion and the
Government's legitimate interests in public
health and gender equality.
Furthermore, when applying the rational
basis test, we are not limited to interests
specifically articulated by the Departments.
We may look to any conceivable legitimate
governmental interest, and "the burden is
upon the challenging party to negative any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis." The more
specific governmental interest in health by
ensuring access to contraception without cost
sharing, which we did not specifically
address in Hobby Lobby, would constitute a
legitimate interest conceivably advanced by
the
accommodation
scheme.
The
Departments' recognized interest in the
uniformity and ease of administration of its
programs would also meet this standard.
The Mandate and accommodation scheme
easily pass the rational basis test. Because the
Mandate is both neutral and generally
applicable and supported by a rational basis,
Plaintiffs fail to make out a plausible claim
under the Free Exercise Clause.

chosen to distinguish between entities based
on neutral, objective organizational criteria
and not by denominational preference or
religiosity, the distinction does not run afoul
of the Establishment Clause.
1. Organizational Distinctions
Established in Federal Law

Well-

Federal law distinguishes between different
types of religious organizations, and as we
discuss below, this differentiation is
constitutionally permissible. Under the ACA
and its implementing regulations, a religious
employer "is organized and operates as a
nonprofit entity and is referred to in section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (a)(3)(A)(iii) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended." The regulations at issue in this
case draw on the tax code's distinction
between houses of worship and religious
non-profits, a "longstanding and familiar"
distinction in federal law.
Exempting churches while requiring other
religious objectors to seek an accommodation
is standard practice under the tax code. The
IRC and other regulations award benefits to
some religious organizations—typically,
houses of worship—based on articulable
criteria that other religious organizations do
not meet.

B. Establishment Clause
Plaintiffs contend that exempting churches
and integrated auxiliaries from the Mandate
but
requiring
religious
non-profit
organizations to seek an accommodation
violates the Establishment Clause. We
disagree. Because the Departments have

Churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions or associations of churches are
automatically considered tax exempt and
need not notify the government they are
applying for recognition, but other religious
non-profit organizations must apply for taxexempt status if their annual gross receipts
are more than $5,000. Similarly, churches,
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their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or
associations of churches, and the exclusively
religious activities of any religious order
need not file tax returns, but religious nonprofit organizations with gross receipts above
$5,000—even if they are tax-exempt—must
file annually. Congress has placed special
limitations on tax inquiries and examinations
of churches, but not integrated auxiliaries,
church-operated schools, or religious nonprofit organizations.
Congress has used similar organizational
distinctions in the realm of religious
accommodations. Churches and qualified
church-controlled organizations that object to
paying Social Security and Medicare taxes
for religious reasons may opt out of paying
them by filing a form with the IRS, but other
religious non-profit organizations may not.
2.
Organizational
Distinctions
Respecting the Religion Clauses

and

Distinctions based on organizational form
enable the government to simultaneously
respect both the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause and permit the
construction of accommodation schemes that
pass constitutional muster. The Supreme
Court has concluded:
[t]he general principle deducible from
the First Amendment and all that has
been said by the Court is this: that we
will
not
tolerate
either
governmentally established religion
or governmental interference with
religion. Short of those expressly
proscribed governmental acts there is
room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will

permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without
interference.
We recognize the Government enjoys some
discretion
in
fashioning
religious
accommodations, and believe doing so on the
basis of organizational form comports with
the Establishment Clause.
3. Organizational Distinctions Compatible
with Larson and Colorado Christian
The Departments have offered the
accommodation to Plaintiffs based on their
organizational form. Plaintiffs rely on the
decisions in Larson v. Valente, and Colorado
Christian University v. Weaver, to support
their Establishment Clause claim. But those
cases do not hold that distinctions based on
organizational type are impermissible.
Larson involved an Establishment Clause
challenge to a Minnesota law that imposed
registration and reporting requirements on
religious organizations that received less than
half of their contributions from members or
affiliated organizations. The legislature drew
this distinction to discriminate against
particular religions, which was evident in the
legislative history. Colorado Christian
differentiated institutions based on intrusive
inquiries into their degree of religiosity. In
Colorado
Christian,
we
concluded
Colorado's exclusion of "pervasively
sectarian" institutions from state scholarship
programs violated the First Amendment "for
two reasons: the program expressly
discriminates among religions without
constitutional justification, and its criteria for
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doing so involve unconstitutionally intrusive
scrutiny of religious belief and practice."
Neither of these two concerns in Colorado
Christian is applicable here.
Larson and Colorado Christian prohibit
preferences based on denomination (e.g.,
Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, etc.) and religiosity
(e.g., pervasively sectarian, moderately
sectarian, non-sectarian, etc.), but do not
prohibit distinctions based on organizational
type (e.g., church, non-profit, university,
etc.). As Larson noted: "The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another."
In Colorado Christian, we determined
that "defendants supply no reason to think
that the government may discriminate
between 'types of institution' on the basis of
the nature of the religious practice these
institutions are moved to engage in." As a
result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence
clearly indicates denominational preferences
expressed by the government are subject to
strict scrutiny. Religiosity distinctions are
subject to strict scrutiny as well because they
involve the government in scrutinizing and
making decisions based on particular
expressions of religious belief.
Plaintiffs cite no case holding that
organizational distinctions, as opposed to
those based on denomination or religiosity,
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Unlike Awad v. Ziriax, which concerned a
state constitutional amendment forbidding
courts from considering or using Sharia law,

evidence of animus or favoritism aimed at a
denomination or degree of religiosity is
absent here. "Because the law's distinction
does not favor a certain denomination and
does not cause excessive entanglement
between government and religion, the
framework
does
not
violate
the
Establishment Clause."
Neither Larson nor Colorado Christian
supports Plaintiffs' claim that distinctions
between churches and other religious entities
is impermissible. As we concluded in
Colorado Christian, "if the State wishes to
choose among otherwise eligible institutions,
it must employ neutral, objective criteria
rather than criteria that involve the evaluation
of contested religious questions and
practices." This is what the Departments have
done with the accommodation scheme in
compliance with the First Amendment's
Establishment
Clause.
4. Plaintiffs' Argument Based on the
Departments' Rationale
Plaintiffs seize on the Departments' rationale
for the distinction that religious non-profit
organizations are more likely than churches
to employ individuals who do not share their
employers' beliefs but are nevertheless
entitled to contraceptive coverage under the
ACA. Plaintiffs argue some denominations
are less likely to carry out ministry functions
through a church or integrated auxiliary than
others, and that the workforces of some nonprofit institutions may be more religiously
homogenous than the workforces of some
established churches.
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The Departments' rationale may not be
perfectly accurate, but it does not make the
accommodation scheme unconstitutional.
The
class
of
religious
non-profit
organizations encompasses a vast array of
religiously affiliated universities, hospitals,
service providers, and charities, some of
them employing thousands of people. Of
course,
some
religious
non-profit
organizations may be more likely than some
churches to employ co-religionists, but the
Departments may reasonably recognize that,
on the whole, churches are more likely to
employ those who share their beliefs. The
Departments originally exempted religious
employers to "respect[] the unique
relationship between a house of worship and
its employees in ministerial positions." We
recognize that relationship between houses of
worship and ministerial employees has been
given special solicitude under the First
Amendment. The Departments must avoid
inquiries that involve them in "excessive
entanglement" between religion and
government, see Colorado Christian, and the
general notion that houses of worship are
more likely than religious non-profit
organizations to employ people of the same
faith avoids impermissible scrutiny into the
beliefs of religious entities and their
employees.
****
Drawing a distinction between religious
employers
and
religious
non-profit
organizations is a neutral and reasonable way
for the Departments to pursue their legitimate
goals in a constitutional manner. It gives
special solicitude to churches to facilitate the

liberties guaranteed by the Free Exercise
Clause, and offers the accommodation
scheme to relieve religious non-profit
organizations of their obligation to provide
contraceptive coverage under the Mandate
without imposing a substantial burden on
their religious exercise. The accommodation
scheme does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
C. Free Speech Clause
Plaintiffs finally contend the accommodation
scheme violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment, which states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech," U.S. Const. amend.
1, by compelling them both to speak and
remain silent, see Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., First, they argue that
requiring them to sign and deliver the Form
or the notification to HHS constitutes
compelled speech. Second, they argue that
prohibiting them from influencing their
TPAs' provision of contraceptive coverage
compels them to be silent. Both arguments
fail.
1. Compelled Speech
The compelled speech claim fails. To the
extent such a claim requires government
interference with the plaintiff's own message,
the regulations do not require an
organization seeking an accommodation to
engage in speech it finds objectionable or
would not otherwise express. The only act the
accommodation scheme requires is for
religious non-profit organizations with group
health plans to sign and deliver the Form or
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notification expressing their religious
objection to providing contraceptive
coverage. The Sixth Circuit reasoned: "Even
assuming the government is compelling this
speech, it is not speech that the appellants
disagree with and so cannot be the basis of a
First Amendment claim." Plaintiffs cannot
point to speech they are required to express
and find objectionable.
Indeed, Plaintiffs have not shown any
likelihood that their sending in the Form or
the notification would convey a message of
support for contraception. Plaintiffs do not
demonstrate their TPA, their health insurance
issuer, or HHS—any one of which would be
the sole recipient of the Form or
notification—would view it as anything other
than an objection to providing contraception.
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst.
Rights, Inc. ("FAIR") is instructive. In FAIR,
a group of law schools challenged the
Solomon Amendment, a federal statute that
denied federal funding to universities that
barred military recruiters from their
campuses. At that time, the military did not
permit gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals
to serve. The schools claimed a First
Amendment compelled speech violation,
arguing their compliance with the Solomon
Amendment would signal their agreement
with this policy. The Supreme Court rejected
the argument, noting compliance did not
signal agreement with the military's
positions, and the Solomon Amendment did
not prevent the schools from making their
own position clear.
This point is even stronger in the instant case,
where Plaintiffs would send the Form or

notification to convey their opposition to
providing contraception, and the ACA and
implementing regulations do not prevent
them from expressing that opposition widely.
Plaintiffs remain free to express opposition to
contraception; "[n]othing in the[] final
regulations prohibits an eligible organization
from expressing its opposition to the use of
contraceptives." With the passage of the
interim final rule, Plaintiffs also have the
option to send a letter or email to HHS
expressly objecting to any provision of
contraception. They can fully explain their
position in that notification. We are
especially unconvinced that this option, freed
from the text of the Form and permitting
greater self-expression, forces Plaintiffs to
engage in unwanted speech. Plaintiffs have
not suggested the notification must be
conveyed or communicated to any third
parties or wider audience aside from the
Departments themselves.
Even if Plaintiffs could identify speech they
disagreed with—for example, identifying the
name of their TPA or health insurance
issuer—the argument that they are forced to
send a message they do not wish to send is
unavailing. The First Amendment does not—
and cannot—protect organizations from
having to make any and all statements "they
wish to avoid." The cases cited by Plaintiffs
are not about routine administrative burdens
akin to complying with the accommodation
scheme.
"Compelling an organization to send a form
to a third party to claim eligibility for an
exemption 'is simply not the same as forcing
a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a
Jehovah's Witness to display the motto "Live
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Free or Die," and it trivializes the freedom
protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest
that it is.'"
"That would be the equivalent of entitling a
tax protester to refuse on First Amendment
grounds to fill out a 1099 form and mail it to
the Internal Revenue Service." None of the
cases cited by Plaintiffs involve compliance
with the administrative requirements of a
government program, and especially not a
government program designed to exempt and
distance an organization from activity it finds
objectionable.
We finally note that Plaintiffs' signature and
delivery of the Form or notification to HHS
is "plainly incidental to the . . . regulation of
conduct" and thus is not protected speech.
The act of signing and delivering the Form or
notification to HHS is required to opt out of
the Mandate. The Supreme Court has
"rejected the view that 'conduct can be
labeled "speech" whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.' Instead, we have extended
First Amendment protection only to conduct
that is inherently expressive." The fact that
Plaintiffs must complete the Form or
notification to HHS to opt out of coverage
does not render the act inherently expressive.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject
Plaintiffs' compelled speech claim.

We further reject the claim that the
accommodation scheme compels Plaintiffs'
silence. Like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits,
we note Plaintiffs have made only general
claims objecting to the non-interference
regulation and have failed to indicate how it
precludes speech in which they wish to
engage. After the issuance of the interim final
rule
repealing
the
non-interference
regulation, we do not believe this question is
before us. We agree with the Government and
the D.C. Circuit that the repeal of the noninterference rule renders Plaintiffs' claims
regarding
compelled
silence
moot.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the district courts'
decisions to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction to Plaintiffs in the three cases
before us. Because we determine the ACA
and its implementing regulations do not
substantially burden Plaintiffs' religious
exercise or violate the Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have not
established a likelihood of success on the
merits or a likely threat of irreparable harm as
required for a preliminary injunction.
We therefore affirm the district court's denial
of a preliminary injunction in Little Sisters,
and reverse the district courts' grant of a
preliminary injunction in Southern Nazarene,
and Reaching Souls.

2. Compelled Silence
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“A Religion Case Too Far for the Supreme Court?”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
July 23, 2015
The court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
has been one of the most religion-friendly
Supreme Courts in modern history. Nearly
every religious claim presented to the court
has emerged a winner, from explicitly
sectarian prayer at town board meetings, in
last year’s closely divided Town of Greece
decision, to beards for Muslim inmates in a
prison system that banned facial hair — a
unanimous decision that defied the court’s
tradition of deference to prison officials and
their rules.
Most famous, of course, was last year’s
Hobby Lobby decision, exempting a forprofit company from having to cover
contraception in its employee health plan, as
otherwise required under the Affordable Care
Act, because of the owners’ religious
scruples about birth control.
Now the post-Hobby Lobby cases have,
inevitably, arrived at the Supreme Court’s
door. Three appeals have been filed so far,
and the justices will decide shortly after the
new term begins in October whether to accept
any of them. At that point, the spotlight will
return to the court, along with the heated
rhetoric about the Obama administration’s
supposed “war on religion.” Not only is there
no such “war,” but the administration has
bent over backward to accommodate
religious claims that are by any measure
extreme. The problem is that the religious
groups pressing these claims refuse to take

yes for an answer. The question is whether
their arguments go too far, even for the
Roberts court.
At issue are the options the Obama
administration has made available to a
category of employers deemed “religious
nonprofit organizations” that object to
including birth control in their employee
health plans. These groups differ from
“religious employers,” a category essentially
limited to churches, which are deemed
exempt under the Affordable Care Act
regulations. Rather, these are religiously
affiliated nonprofits such as colleges,
seminaries and religious orders like the Little
Sisters of the Poor, which runs nursing homes
and describes itself as an equal-opportunity
employer in its hiring practices for lay staff
members. These nonprofits do have to
provide contraception coverage unless they
accept the administration’s offer to opt out of
the requirement by passing the legal
obligation on to their insurance carriers.
Under pre-existing regulations that the
Obama administration fine-tuned in the
aftermath of the Hobby Lobby decision, all
these organizations have to do to qualify for
the exemption is to ask for it, by filling out a
two-page form, or even more simply by
sending a letter to the Department of Health
and Human Services declaring that they have
a religious objection to paying for birth
control. At that point, their obligation ceases
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and the coverage has to be provided by the
organizations’ insurance carrier or, in the
case of a self-insured plan, by the third-party
administrator, without any financial
involvement by the organization.
Dozens of these organizations promptly filed
suit claiming that they couldn’t possibly fill
out the form or sign the letter because to do
so would make them complicit in the ultimate
choice their employees might make to use
birth control.
It’s important to understand the difference
between these cases and the lawsuit by
Hobby Lobby’s owners. As a for-profit
company,
Hobby
Lobby
had
no
accommodation available. It had either to
provide the coverage or pay a huge fine. In
fact, the court’s majority opinion, written by
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., strongly
suggested that the problem, as the majority
saw it, could be solved if only the
administration would offer Hobby Lobby the
same choice it was giving the religious
nonprofits. Justice Alito wrote that the
Department of Health and Human Services
“itself has demonstrated that it has at its
disposal an approach that is less restrictive
than requiring employers to fund
contraceptive methods that violate their
religious beliefs.” In a footnote, he added:
“The less restrictive approach we describe
accommodates the religious beliefs asserted
in these cases.” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
who provided the fifth vote to the majority,
wrote in a concurring opinion that the
accommodation as described “does not
impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.”

The Hobby Lobby case had not been argued
on this basis, and Justice Alito noted that the
court was not deciding whether such an
accommodation would suffice “for purposes
of all religious claims.” To that extent, the
statements were nonbinding “dicta,” not part
of the holding. But they have had a powerful
influence in the lower courts. Cases
challenging
the
adequacy
of
the
accommodation as applied to religious
nonprofits have now made their way through
six of the 12 federal appellate circuits.
Remarkably, every court has rejected the
religious claims.
Not all the decisions have been unanimous;
there have been dissenting opinions by
individual judges, a fact that may lead the
Supreme Court to accept one or more of the
pending appeals despite the absence of the
“conflict in the circuits” that the court usually
waits for. But, notably, judges across the
ideological spectrum have ruled for the
government. One of the country’s most
conservative federal judges, Jerry E. Smith,
wrote the opinion last month for a unanimous
panel of one of the country’s most
conservative courts, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision
“is of no help to the plaintiffs’ position,”
Judge Smith wrote in East Texas Baptist
University v. Burwell. The reason, he
explained, was “not just that there are more
links in the causal chain here than in Hobby
Lobby.” Rather, it was that “what the
regulations require of the plaintiffs here has
nothing to do with providing contraceptives.”
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It’s worth quoting Judge Smith at some
length, including his reference to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
federal law under which the Hobby Lobby
case and the current cases were brought:
“The plaintiffs urge that the accommodation
uses their plans as vehicles for payments for
contraceptives. But that is just what the
regulations prohibit. Once the plaintiffs apply
for the accommodation, the insurers may not
include contraceptive coverage in the plans.
The insurers and third-party administrators
may not impose any direct or indirect costs
for contraceptives on the plaintiffs; they may
not send materials about contraceptives
together with plan materials; in fact, they
must send plan participants a notice
explaining that the plaintiffs do not
administer or fund contraceptives. The
payments for contraceptives are completely
independent of the plans. . . The acts that
violate their faith are the acts of the
government, insurers, and third-party
administrators, but R.F.R.A. does not entitle
them to block third parties from engaging in
conduct with which they disagree.”
And of course, the choices and the rights of
third parties, in this instance, the female
employees, are the whole point. It is not only
that female employees, and not their bosses,
make the choice to use birth control. It is that
the employers’ religious objections, if
honored, would cause these third parties
actual harm — harm that would be avoided if
the employers simply signed the form or sent
the letter. The extreme to which the plaintiffs’
refusal takes their “complicity” argument is
what the appeals courts have found so

alarming. The organizations don’t want to
pay for birth control and they don’t want
anyone else to pay for it either.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
10th Circuit had this to say in a decision last
week, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell:
“Plaintiffs sincerely oppose contraception,
but their religious objection cannot hamstring
government efforts to ensure that plan
participants and beneficiaries receive the
coverage to which they are entitled.”
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
court said, “does not prevent the government
from reassigning obligations after an objector
opts out simply because the objector strongly
opposes the ultimate goal of the generally
applicable law. Plaintiffs’ complicity
argument therefore fails. Opting out would
eliminate their complicity with the mandate
and require only routine and minimal
administrative paperwork, and they are not
substantially burdened by the government’s
subsequent efforts to deliver contraceptive
coverage in their stead.”
Writing in The National Catholic Reporter
last week, Michael Sean Winters, author of a
blog on the publication’s website called
Distinctly Catholic, praised the 10th Circuit
decision, saying: “If you think the form used
to object to participation is itself a form of
participation, I am not sure how we, as a
nation, can ever carve out religious
exemptions.”
Evidently, the religious groups pressing this
litigation would rather keep fighting than
declare victory. Mark Rienzi, senior counsel

473

of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
which represents the Little Sisters of the Poor
and is involved in many of the other cases,
responded to the 10th Circuit’s decision by
accusing the Obama administration of an
“unrelenting pursuit of the Little Sisters of
the Poor” and of seeking to “crush the Little
Sisters’ faith.”
Hyperbole in defense of a legal position is no
crime, certainly. But the vigor with which the
complicity claim is being pressed does raise
the question: What’s going on? In an
illuminating article last month in The
American Prospect titled “Conscience and
the Culture Wars,” two constitutional
scholars, Reva B. Siegel of Yale and Douglas
NeJaime of U.C.L.A., observe that “the new
conservative campaign for religious
exemptions follows a well-established
pattern” in which advocates whose core
positions have lost legitimacy in the public
mind “look for new ways to frame their
views, often borrowing from their
opponents.”
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was
passed in 1993 by overwhelming bipartisan
majorities in Congress and signed into law by
President Bill Clinton; it was not proposed or
seen as an agent of the culture wars. But it has
become one, Professors Siegel and NeJaime
argue: “After failing to prohibit abortion and
same-sex marriage, conservatives have
sought to create religious exemptions from
laws that protect the right to abortion or
same-sex marriage.” They explain: “If unable
to protect traditional sexual morality through
laws of general application, conservatives
can protect traditional values through liberal

frames — by asserting claims to religious
exemption and by appealing to secular
commitments
to
pluralism
and
nondiscrimination.” Reva Siegel has
elsewhere described this strategy as
“preservation through transformation.”
Will the Roberts court buy it? Or, I suppose,
the question might be framed more precisely:
Will Justice Kennedy? I don’t see it. The
implications are too enormous. As the 10th
Circuit observed, “Courts have recognized
that, to opt out of military service for
religious reasons, a conscientious objector
must notify the government of his objection
knowing that someone else will take his
place.” Complicity? People have to pay their
taxes, whether they have objections, religious
or otherwise, to the wars they thereby help to
finance. Complicity?
Of course, the court might avoid ensnaring
itself in this web by allowing the circuit court
decisions to continue to unfold in uniform
fashion, as the justices briefly did with samesex marriage last fall, before a
nonconforming decision from the Sixth
Circuit forced their hand. I hope the court
doesn’t wait. This year marks the 50th
anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, the
case that identified a constitutional right to
birth control. At issue now is not only the
right of women who happen to work for a
religious employer to receive, on par with
other women, a benefit the government
deems an essential part of health care. At
stake is the health of civil society in an
increasingly diverse country. Religious
conflict is a worldwide problem that of
course lies far outside the Supreme Court’s
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purview. But the court can do its part, as I
believe it will, by labeling this anachronistic

and politically driven dispute over birth
control for what it is, a case too far.
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“With Health Care Lawsuit, the Little Sisters of the Poor Step into
the Spotlight”
The Washington Post
Saba Hamedy
January 20, 2014
People recognized Saint Jeanne Jugan by the
begging basket she carried while walking
down the roads of Brittany, in northwest
France, in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries.
Going from door to door, Jugan would ask
people for money, gifts — whatever they
could spare for the elderly poor.
Nearly 175 years later, nuns from the
religious order Jugan founded, the Little
Sisters of the Poor, can still be seen in public,
collecting donations to support their work.
Unlike some nuns who wear casual clothing
these days, the Little Sisters dress in
traditional habits, all-white or black with gray
veils.

The sisters, who are among 45 religious
groups fighting the legislation, take issue
with an element of the law that requires all
employers, regardless of religious affiliation,
to provide insurance coverage for
contraception to their workers. For the
sisters, that would include employees at 29
homes they operate for the elderly in cities
across the United States, including
Baltimore, Chicago and Los Angeles.
The order’s “entire reason for being is to
serve the poor and elderly,” said Robert
Destro, a law professor at Catholic
University.
So why join a widely watched legal battle?

Except for their soliciting of donations, the
members of the “begging order,” as it’s
sometimes known, have largely stayed out of
the spotlight. But that changed in September
when the order became one of the plaintiffs
in a lawsuit filed against the Affordable Care
Act’s contraceptive mandate, placing it at the
center of a debate over health care and
religious freedom.

“They didn’t think they had any other
choice,” said Daniel Blomberg, senior
counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, a nonprofit public-interest law firm
dedicated to protecting the free expression of
religious traditions. The Little Sisters
approached the Becket Fund about possible
legal action, and the firm filed suit on behalf
of the order’s home in Denver, which has 60
employees who are not nuns.

The nonprofit gained even more public
attention when Supreme Court Justice Sonia
Sotomayor granted a last-minute temporary
injunction Dec. 31, giving the sisters a
reprieve from the requirement.

Blomberg said the sisters had two options:
provide contraception coverage to their
employees, in violation of their Roman
Catholic beliefs, or pay hefty tax fines for
failing to comply with the law.
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The Obama administration offered churchrelated organizations, including the Little
Sisters, an accommodation, allowing them to
opt out of the mandate if they signed a selfcertification form.
The compromise would mean that the sisters
would not have to provide contraceptive
coverage themselves, but in many cases their
workers would be able to get birth control
from their insurance carriers.
Some Catholic groups accepted that
compromise, but many, like the Little Sisters,
did not.
“The mandate violates our religious
freedoms,” said Mother Loraine Marie Clare
Maguire, provincial superior of the
congregation’s Baltimore province.
The Little Sisters, who came to the United
States in 1868, have 10 to 13 sisters in each
home. They serve more than 13,000 elderly
poor people in 31 countries around the world,
said Sister Constance Carolyn Veit, the
order’s spokeswoman.
The Little Sisters do not belong to the
Leadership Conference of Women Religious,
the umbrella group for most American nuns,
which was censured by the Vatican for
promoting what it called “radical feminist
themes.” Instead, the Little Sisters belong to
the Council of Major Superiors of Women
Religious, and with 300 members in the
United States they are considered one of the
larger religious communities in the
organization.

In addition to vows of chastity, poverty and
obedience, the Little Sisters take a vow of
hospitality. Admission to their homes is open
to low-income people who are at least 60
years old, regardless of religion. Homes vary
in size and offer several levels of care,
including nursing homes and residential or
assisted living.
As their founder, Jugan, ordered, the Little
Sisters do not have an endowment.
The strong family spirit the sisters share with
the elderly poor and their tradition of begging
distinguishes them as an order, Veit said. The
nuns put faith in Saint Joseph, their patron
saint, and their motto: “If God is with us, it
will be accomplished.”
“A lot of people look at poor elderly as if they
don’t matter,” Blomberg said. “The sisters
push back against that and make it very clear
that these lives do matter. They are
committed to honoring life at its very end.”
Pope Benedict XVI addressed the importance
of their mission while visiting the Little
Sisters in London in September 2010.
“I come to you as a brother who knows well
the joys and struggles that come with age,” he
said, according to the order’s Web site. “As
advances in medicine and other factors lead
to increased longevity, it is important to
recognize the presence of growing numbers
of older people as a blessing for society.”
Jugan, who was canonized by Benedict in
2009, often said, “Making the elderly happy
— that is everything.”
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Maguire says she hopes the sisters can
continue channeling their founder for at least
another 175 years.
“We take care of the elderly poor,” she said.
“That’s really our main concern and
objective: to live that mission.”
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“Why Little Sisters of the Poor is Right to Be Concerned about
Religious Freedom”
The Daily Signal
Elizabeth Slatterly
July 31, 2015
The Obama administration continues its
persistent attack on the Little Sisters of the
Poor following their challenge to the
Obamacare abortion drug mandate.
Earlier this summer, the 10th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled against the Little
Sisters in their challenge to the Affordable
Care Act requirement that they provide
employees with health care coverage that
includes contraceptives, sterilization, and
abortion-inducing drugs and devices, or fill
out a form notifying the Department of
Health and Human Services of their religious
objection to providing such coverage.
The Obama administration considers this
second option as accommodating the Little
Sisters’ religious beliefs because the
notification initiates the process of insurers
and third-party administrators providing the
mandated coverage at no cost to the insured.
The Little Sisters, however, maintain that this
so-called accommodation does no such thing.
Filling out the form does not insulate them
from complicity in the facilitation of
potentially life-ending drugs and devices, and
that substantially burdens their free exercise
of religion.
Noel Francisco and Paul Pohl, counsel for
other nonprofit religious employers that are
challenging the accommodation, aptly noted

that this “does not accommodate the
plaintiffs’ religious beliefs at all” because it
“still forces [the religious employers] to hire
and maintain a contract with an insurance
company that will provide the objectionable
… Maintaining this relationship is exactly
what the plaintiffs find religiously
objectionable.”
As Francisco and Pohl analogize:
Imagine that you hire a piano tutor for
your children and learn that the tutor
is supplying them with free cigarettes.
You might object to maintaining the
arrangement, regardless of whether
you are paying for the cigarettes. Or
imagine you have a religious
objection to alcohol and learn that the
caterer you have hired for your
wedding is going to serve free booze
to all of your wedding guests. You
might want to fire the caterer.
It’s worth mentioning two other alternatives
available to the Little Sisters: drop their
health insurance or pay crushing fines of up
to $100 per employee per day.
The 10th Circuit panel agreed with the
Obama administration, finding that the
accommodation “relieves [the Little Sisters]
of their statutory obligation” to provide the
objectionable coverage.
The panel wrote that the Little Sisters are
wrong about the legal effect of filling out this
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form because “[f]ederal law, not the form or
notification of HHS, provides contraceptive
coverage.”
Thus, in the panel’s view, the Little Sisters’
argument that its act triggers coverage “fails
to establish any burden” on their religious
exercise, and even if it did establish a burden,
the
panel
reasoned,
“de
minimis
administrative tasks do not substantially
burden religious exercise.”
Linda Greenhouse opined in the New York
Times that the Little Sisters’ claims are
“anachronistic and politically driven” and “a
case too far.”
Greenhouse asserts that the “administration
has bent over backward to accommodate
religious claims.” But this misses the heart of
the Little Sisters’ objection.

involvement of the Little Sisters’ healthcare
plan.
As Justice Samuel Alito noted in the majority
opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the
government could provide or pay for these
drugs and devices itself, while allowing the
Little Sisters and other non-profits to obey
their conscience.
The Little Sisters last week filed a cert.
petition asking the Supreme Court to review
their case, one of six accommodation cases
pending before the Court.
Let’s hope the justices agree to hear one of
these cases next term—and that one branch
of government takes the right of conscience
seriously.

Though the government may believe its
accommodation is sufficient to distance
religious employers from acts they find
morally objectionable, the Little Sisters (and
many others) clearly do not agree.
As the Little Sisters explained in a brief filed
with the 10th Circuit, the accommodation
“merely offers [them] another way to violate
their religion.”
The 10th Circuit panel declared that the Little
Sister’s
“religious
objection
cannot
hamstring government efforts to ensure that
plan participants and beneficiaries receive the
coverage to which they are entitled.”
But employees may obtain contraception in
numerous ways without forcing the
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